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MIGRANTS CAN MAKE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Ama Ruth Francis*
Migrants have the power to make international law as norm creators. The nation-state
enjoys a monopoly on violence in domestic jurisgenesis, but international law’s constraint on
the use of force provides non-state actors the opportunity to participate in the formation of
international legal doctrine without the threat of violence. Scholars have overlooked this non-
state jurisgenerative potential, bound by a state-centric conception of law. This Article applies
the claim that non-state actors have the power to influence international law to the transna-
tional issue of climate-induced migration. Climate change intensifies slow- and sudden-onset
events, and sudden-onset disasters already displace millions annually. Yet international law
grants nation-states the right to largely exclude foreigners such that climate migrants have no
right to enter another country, resettle, or be protected against forcible return when they are
displaced across borders. While liberal scholars defend this right to exclude as necessary for the
preservation of sovereignty, the majority of nation-states participate in free movement agree-
ments—regional trade agreements that promote migration—demonstrating that sovereignty
and exclusion are not mutually constitutive.
Ultimately, I leverage the challenge of climate-induced migration to ask who has the
power to change international law. My response proceeds in two parts. First, the Article
challenges the state-centric focus of international law to call attention to non-state actors’
ability to create legal norms. Second, I draw on diasporic theory to argue that the Global South
diaspora—Global Southerners living in the Global North—should leverage their hybrid posi-
tionality to create legal norms that reconstitute sovereignty through admission. International
migration theorists reproduce the paradigmatic image of a Global North and Global South
border contest, and foreclose the possibility of migrant’s jurisgenerative capacity. This Article
intentionally shifts the frame to highlight the power that a territorially-unbounded Global
South people have to shape international legal norms.
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INTRODUCTION
Migrants can make international law as norm creators. The nation-state
enjoys a monopoly on violence, and uses this monopoly to violently enforce
domestic law. In the domestic realm, non-state actors must thus consider vio-
lent opposition when attempting to participate in jurisgenesis—the creation of
legal meaning—that counters the nation-state’s interpretation of the law. How-
ever, international law constrains nation-states’ use of force. Therefore, in the-
ory, non-state actors can participate in international legal norm creation
without the threat of violence.
Most scholars overlook non-state jurisgenerative potential because of a
state-centric conception of international law. The habitual lens of the Global
North–Global South contest further blinds migration scholarship in particular.
Migration scholars typically theorize from a position that rightly recognizes
that the Global South is always set to lose in the conflict between the Global
North and Global South, but wrongly conclude that Global Southerners are
therefore powerless. This Article intentionally shifts the frame to name a terri-
torially unbounded Global South people as agents of international legal norm
creation.
Border contests between the Global South and Global North have been
rife over the past five years, leading to significant developments in the interna-
tional law of migration. In 2018, thousands of Central American migrants
landed at the United States–Mexico border in Tijuana, starting off a wave of
migration that has continued into 2020.1 The migrants of this “Central Ameri-
can Exodus” arrived seeking asylum, driven by climate change, economic hard-
ship, gang violence, and food insecurity.2 President Donald Trump called the
migrants criminals, declared a national emergency to build a wall at the border,
1. See Maya Averbuch & Elisabeth Malkin, Migrants in Tijuana Run to U.S. Border, but Fall
Back in Face of Tear Gas, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/2NW5-TMPY;
Patrick J. McDonnell & Kate Linthicum, By Turning Back Caravans, Mexico Is Acting as
Trump’s Border Wall, Critics Say, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/BM9S-
M4AF.
2. See Oliver Milman et al., The Unseen Driver Behind the Migrant Caravan: Climate Change,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/PKY8-7AJG.
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and planned to cut $450 million in foreign aid to Central American countries.3
Migrants were held in overcrowded detention centers for prolonged periods,
and children were separated from their families.4
In Europe, the death of 1,250 migrants crossing the Mediterranean in
2015 signaled the climax of a similar migration disaster.5 The image of a Syrian
boy washed up dead on shore later that year in Turkey became a symbolic
stand-in for the record number of refugees and migrants in the twenty-first
century, and the life-threatening nature of their journeys.6 There were more
than 270 million migrants in 2019, a fifty-one-million increase within the last
decade.7 The image of the dead Syrian boy also gestured towards the inade-
quacy of the international legal system in handling contemporary migration
flows.8
In response to 2015, the “year of human suffering and migrant tragedies,”
then United Nations (“U.N.”) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called for a
global compact on human mobility9 that would increase “safe channels for regu-
lar migration”; foster cooperation between countries of origin, transit, and des-
tination; and promote respect for the human rights of migrants.10 Ban’s efforts
crystallized in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (“New
York Declaration”), a resolution adopted at the 71st Session of the U.N. Gen-
3. See Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a Constitutional Clash,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/F65K-TQ2T. The Central American coun-
tries Trump targeted included Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. See Julian Borger,
Trump Plans to Cut Central America Aid, Blaming Countries for Migrant Caravans, GUARD-
IAN (Apr. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/7JV7-PS5M.
4. See Letter from Jennifer L. Castello, Acting Insp. Gen., Off. of Insp. Gen., to Hon. Kevin
K. McAleenan, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 2, 2019).
5. See Press Release, Int’l Org. for Migr. [IOM], Over 3,770 Migrants Have Died Trying to
Cross the Mediterranean to Europe in 2015 (Dec. 31, 2015), https://perma.cc/Q5DD-
CA6M.
6. See Ban Ki-moon, Sec’y-Gen., U.N., Remarks at High-Level Meeting on Migration and
Refugee Flows (Sept. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/VX38-4H8P.
7. The Number of International Migrants Reaches 272 Million, Continuing an Upward Trend in
All World Regions, Says UN, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFS. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://
perma.cc/4FJP-FNME.
8. See, e.g., Ban Ki-moon, supra note 6. R
9. The term ‘mobility’ encompasses the spectrum of forced and voluntary, and internal and
cross-border movement, as well as planned relocation. HUMAN MOBILITY IN THE CON-
TEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: ELEMENTS FOR THE UNFCCC PARIS AGREEMENT (2015),
https://perma.cc/NC98-X6PN. See also W. Neil Adger et al., Mobility, Displacement and
Migration, and Their Interactions with Vulnerability and Adaptation to Environmental Risks, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 29 (Robert McLeman &
François Gemenne eds., 2018).
10. Press Release, U.N. Sec’y-Gen., On International Migrants Day, Secretary-General Calls
for Commitment to Human-Rights-Based Responses Guided by International Law, U.N.
Press Release SG/SM/17421-DEV/3212-OBV/1571 (Dec. 16, 2015).
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eral Assembly.11 A direct response to migrant death, the New York Declaration
states that U.N. member states are “determined to save lives.”12 The New York
Declaration also committed U.N. member states to developing two mobility
agreements: the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
(“Global Compact”) and the Global Compact on Refugees (“GCR”).13
The emergence of the Global Compact demonstrates the power of non-
state actors to drive the creation of international law. The death of more than a
thousand migrants crossing the Mediterranean to Europe catalyzed the creation
of the Global Compact, the first ever intergovernmentally negotiated agree-
ment on migration. The Global Compact shifts the contemporary conception
of the appropriate sovereign response towards migrants, that is, away from ex-
clusion and towards admission. To put it in theoretical terms, the deadly inter-
action between migrants and Europe prompted the enunciation of a new global
norm on nation-state14 responsibility toward foreign nationals.15 The Global
Compact’s articulation that nation-states should facilitate migration will, ac-
cording to Koh’s transnational legal process, become internalized in domestic
law.16 However, not only dead migrants can persuade the nation-state. Non-
state actors, including migrants, have the jurisgenerative power to further sup-
port a normative transition in international law toward admission.
A shift in nation-state responsibility toward migrants remains necessary as
various transnational challenges alter global mobility flows. In the climate
change realm, for example, an overreliance on territorial sovereignty leaves in-
ternational law ill-equipped to deal with climate-induced migration. Interna-
tional law largely grants nation-states the right to exclude foreigners, which
creates a protection gap; the right to exclude leaves climate migrants with no
rights to admission or to stay when they are displaced across borders. Liberal
scholars defend the right to exclude as necessary for the preservation of sover-
11. G.A. Res. 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Oct. 3, 2016).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The joint term nation-state, credited to Georg W.F. Hegel, conveys the combined sense of
both the nation, a community of people with a shared national character, and the state, a
political entity exercising territorial dominion. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOW-
ERED SELF 7 (1999).
15. See generally Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997) (describing the transnational legal process as a three-part process in which a transna-
tional actor, or actors, provokes an interaction which prompts an interpretation of a relevant
global norm that results in the internationalization of the new interpretation into a domestic
legal system); see also Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181
(1996). The U.N. established a financing mechanism to support countries in implementing
the Global Compact nationally. See Start-Up Fund for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,
U.N., https://perma.cc/CA2H-22UJ.
16. See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 15, at 2603. R
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eignty. Yet sovereignty need not necessarily be constituted through exclusion of
foreigners.
Nation-states remain sovereign even when opting for more open admis-
sion policies. For example, more than 60% of nation-states participate in free
movement agreements (“FMAs”)—provisions within (sub-)regional economic
integration schemes that ease migration restrictions between participating
member nation-states—thereby choosing to abrogate their right to exclude in
the context of regional integration.17 FMAs serve as one solution to the cli-
mate-induced protection gap because of the mobility they facilitate, and further
demonstrate that preserving sovereignty while limiting the exercise of the right
to exclude is feasible, and even beneficial.
The benefits of more liberal migration policies extend beyond the climate
context. Heightened mobility flows in response to a range of drivers, including
climate change, demand increased regular migration pathways.18 Favoring ad-
mission over exclusion creates economic advantages, both in terms of filling
labor market shortages and enhancing development gains.19 If migrants can
make international law, then migrants in the Global North, and other members
of the Global South diaspora, should use their jurisgenerative potential to par-
ticipate in reformulating the relationship between sovereignty and the right to
exclude.
Ultimately, this Article leverages the failure of international law vis-à-vis
climate-induced migration to ask who has the power to change international
law. My response proceeds in two turns. First, the Article challenges the state-
centric focus of international law to call attention to non-state actors’ ability to
create legal norms. I argue that migrants can participate in international norm
creation. Second, I draw on diasporic theory to locate the Global South dias-
pora as a powerful non-state actor in the field of international migration law,
and recommend that the Global South diaspora leverage their hybrid position-
ality to support the reconceptualization of sovereignty through admission rather
than exclusion.20
17. Vincent Chetail, The Transnational Movement of Persons Under General International Law:
Mapping the Customary Law Foundations of International Migration Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MIGRATION 1, 33–35 (Vincent Chetail &
Céline Bauloz eds., 2014). The European Union (“EU”) serves as the most well-known
example of an FMA.
18. This is the central thesis of the Global Compact, which also states that the agreement af-
firms “the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy and their
prerogative to govern migration within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international
law.” Global Compact on Migration, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migra-
tion, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.231/4 (July 13, 2018).
19. See infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of these economic benefits at a regional level.
20. One way the international legal norms that non-state actors create might become embedded
in domestic law is through a transnational legal process. See Koh, Transnational Legal Process,
supra note 15. However, the precise mechanism by which these norms are generated and R
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Part I provides an overview of climate-induced migration. I map out the
“legal void”21 surrounding migrants displaced across borders by climate-related
events, and identify the right to exclude as the source of this protection gap.
Part II supports the argument for reconstituting sovereignty through admission
by first providing an account of the right to exclude, the doctrine’s discrimina-
tory history, and then contemporary justifications of the doctrine. I posit that
the constitutive relationship between sovereignty and the right to exclude pits
sovereign rights against migrant rights. Contemporary justifications for an un-
fettered right to exclude center on the claim that migrants pose a threat to
liberal democracy, and build on the discriminatory foundation of the doctrine.
Although the right to exclude produces deadly results, the doctrine goes
unchallenged.
The challenge of climate-induced migration, where climate migrants re-
main without legal protection largely due to international law’s constitution of
sovereignty through exclusion, thus leads me to the question of who has the
power to change international law. Part III gives the classical response, before
asserting the jurisgenerative power of non-state actors. I leverage the fact of
nonviolent enforcement in international law to make the claim that non-state
actors have the capacity to create legal norms in the international sphere with-
out the threat of violence. Finally, Part IV draws on diasporic theory to first
name the Global South diaspora as a collective, before arguing that the Global
South diaspora can leverage their jurisgenerative capacity and multiplicitous
positionality to engage in a transnational legal process that results in more liber-
alized borders.
I. THE CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION CHALLENGE
This Part provides a conceptual overview of climate-induced migration,
and discusses the discourse on terminology. It also describes the international
governance structure that has grown to address climate-induced migration over
the past decade. Finally, it outlines the legal protection gap that remains despite
these developments in governance, given that climate-induced migration gener-
ally does not fall under the scope of international refugee law, and contempo-
rary constructions of sovereignty insist on the nation-state’s right to exclude.
integrated into law merits further research, which falls outside the scope of this Article’s
primary set of aims, including first naming the Global South diaspora as a non-state actor
with jurisgenerative potential.
21. António Guterres, UNHCR, Statement at Intergovernmental Meeting at Ministerial Level
to Mark the 60th Anniversary of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Dec. 7, 2011), https://perma.cc/HA2Y-R9FM.
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A. Impacts & Terminology
Climate change refers to the increase of average global temperature above
preindustrial levels caused by greenhouse gas emissions, including carbon diox-
ide and other air pollutants. Anthropogenic climate change has already caused
1°C of warming.22 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the lead-
ing scientific body on climate change, reports that at even 0.5°C more of warm-
ing, the effects would be catastrophic. Atoll islands would become
uninhabitable,23 several hundred million people would become exposed to “cli-
mate-related risks and susceptible to poverty,” and crops like maize and wheat
would decline in yield, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and
Central and South America.24 Disadvantaged and vulnerable populations face
disproportionately higher risk of experiencing the negative consequences of cli-
mate change.25 Indeed, climate change’s adverse impacts—including food inse-
curity, scarce water supply, risks to human health, and slowed economic
growth—are and will continue to be concentrated in the Global South.26 Yet
the entire global community needs to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 to
avoid death-dealing effects, which will require rapid and extensive transitions in
energy, land, infrastructure, and industry.27
In addition to the systemic food and water shortages caused by climate
change, environmental disasters, which have long prompted human movement,
will continue to increase in frequency and severity.28 The risk of being displaced
by a disaster has quadrupled since the 1970s.29 Disasters outstripped violence
22. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON THE IM-
PACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED
GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHEN-
ING THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DE-
VELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY (2018), https://perma.cc/X9ZW-
6F5K [hereinafter IPCC, 1.5°C REPORT].
23. See Ove Hoegh-Guldberg et al., Impacts of 1.5°C Global Warming on Natural and Human
Systems, in IPCC, 1.5°C REPORT, supra note 22, at 175, 235. R
24. Myles R. Allen et al., Summary for Policymakers, in IPCC, 1.5°C REPORT, supra note 22, at R
1, 9.
25. Id.
26. See Briana Mawby & Anna Applebaum, Future Fragility: Women, Climate Change, and Mi-
gration, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY 209 (Soumita Basu et al.
eds., 2020). I use the Global South to refer both to a set of countries and peoples on the
margins of globalization. See infra Part IV.B for further discussion of the Global South.
27. Id.
28. See Hoegh-Guldberg et al., supra note 23; Jane McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide: Why a R
Climate Change Displacement Treaty Is Not the Answer, INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 2, 2–3 (2011).
29. Jane McAdam, Building International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters, and Displace-
ment, 33 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 1, 3 (2016).
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and conflict as the lead cause of displacement in the first half of 2019.30 The
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reports that approximately 265 mil-
lion people have been displaced due to natural hazards since 2008.31 Thirty-six
million people were displaced by sudden-onset disasters in 2008, with 56% be-
ing displaced by climate-related disasters.32 Almost all of this disaster displace-
ment occurs in the Global South.33
While climate migrants enjoy no definition in international law, the stan-
dard definition of an environmental migrant provides a framework for under-
standing climate-induced migration. The International Organization for
Migration (“IOM”) defines environmental migrants as:
[P]ersons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden
or progressive change in the environment that adversely affect their
lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or
choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move
either within their country or abroad.34
Similarly, climate-induced migration encompasses movement that is temporary
or permanent, voluntary or forced, internal or cross-border; but it describes
movement that occurs in response to climate-related events. Scholars have in-
troduced a range of terms to describe climate migrants, including climate refu-
gees, forced climate migrants, disaster displaced persons, climate displacees, and
climate-induced migrants.35
30. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR., MID YEAR FIGURES: INTERNAL DIS-
PLACEMENT FROM JANUARY TO JUNE 2019, at 3 (2019).
31. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR., DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, A GLOBAL
REVIEW 2008–2018 5 (2018).
32. U.N. OFF. FOR THE COORD. OF HUMANITARIAN AFFS. ET AL., MONITORING DISASTER
DISPLACEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 8 (2009).
33. See Michelle Leighton & Meredith Byrne, With Millions Displaced by Climate Change or
Extreme Weather, Is There a Role for Labor Migration Pathways?, MIGR. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 3,
2017), https://perma.cc/269A-G735.
34. IOM, Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment, 94th Sess., ¶ 6 MC/INF/288
(Nov. 1, 2007).
35. See Sumudu Anopama Atapattu, A New Category of Refugees? ‘Climate Refugees’ and a Gaping
Hole in International Law, in ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES’: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 34, 40
(Simon Berhman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018) [hereinafter ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES’]; OLI
BROWN, MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2008). Ever since the term ‘environmental
refugees’ was coined in the 1980s, responses have fallen into two camps: alarmists & skep-
tics. Alarmists highlight the forced nature of migration, overemphasize the role of environ-
mental factors in migration, and predict that hundreds of millions of people will migrate.
Skeptics, the category into which most climate-induced migration scholars tend to fall, offer
more conservative estimates and a multi-causal view of climate-induced migration. See Susan
Martin, Climate Change, Migration & Governance, 16 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 397, 397
(2010). Other scholars have opted for terminology that focuses on disaster-induced migra-
tion generally, embracing climate-related events as a migration driver, but not excluding
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The choice of terminology is not a neutral one. As Oli Brown frames it,
“which definition becomes generally accepted will have very real implications
for the obligations of the international community under international law.”36
International law designates those who are forced to move as “displaced per-
sons” or “refugees,” and guarantees them more legal protection than those who
are moving voluntarily, or “migrants.”37 Thus some scholars have insisted on
using the term “climate refugees,” implicitly arguing that the protection
frameworks offered by international refugee law should apply to those moving
in the climate context.38 While the discourse on the forced versus voluntary
nature of climate-induced migration is important, it is even more critical for the
terminology to retain an emphasis on climate change specifically, versus envi-
ronmental degradation generally, in order to highlight the scale of mobility ren-
dered necessary by climate change.39
Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer identify five categories of movement
within climate-induced migration: i) migration prompted by sudden-onset di-
sasters, for example, flooding and hurricanes, which tends to be temporary and
internal; ii) slow-onset degradation, for example, rising sea levels, and increased
groundwater and soil salinization, which often results in permanent migration;
iii) “ ‘sinking’ small island states,” which present a unique case of slow-onset
disasters that climate change will not affect such as earthquakes and tsunamis. Walter Kälin,
for example, argues that those displaced by disasters unrelated to climate change, like vol-
canic eruptions, deserve as much protection as those displaced by climate-related events. See
Walter Kälin, Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND
DISPLACEMENT 82, 85 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010).
36. OLI BROWN, CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION 7 (2007).
37. WALTER KÄLIN & NINA SCHREPFER, PROTECTING PEOPLE CROSSING BORDERS IN THE
CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: NORMATIVE GAPS AND POSSIBLE APPROACHES 29
(2012). Forced displacement can trigger protection measures under international refugee law
and human rights law in a way voluntary migration would not, although the line between
voluntary and forced displacement remains notoriously difficult to tease apart. Kälin, supra
note 35, at 95. There is no legal definition of a migrant, although “migrant worker” is a legal R
term. See G.A. Res. 45/158, art. 2(1), International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Dec. 18, 1990).
38. See, e.g., Atapattu, supra note 35. For further discussion on international refugee law’s exclu- R
sion of climate migrants, see infra Part I.C. I opt for the term climate-induced migration to
describe movement that is forced or voluntary, permanent or temporary, cross-border or
internal, prompted in part by climatic events. This definition recognizes climate change as
one of the factors that drives movement, while remaining legally precise. Furthermore, ac-
knowledging the multi-causal nature of mobility in the terminology remains important for
designing solutions that address climate change and its interaction with other critical drivers,
especially economic factors.
39. JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
42 (2012); see also Maxine Burkett, Justice and Climate Migration: The Importance of Nomen-
clature in the Discourse on Twenty-First-Century Mobility, in ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES,’ supra
note 35, at 73–74 (discussing the human rights and justice implications of climate-induced R
migration terminology).
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disasters wherein rising sea levels combine with low-lying island topography to
render islands uninhabitable; iv) high-risk zones that governments declare dan-
gerous for human habitation, or planned relocation; and v) forced displacement
due to violence, armed conflict, or unrest because of a scarcity of essential re-
sources like water, arable land, or grazing grounds.40 Notwithstanding these
categories, climate change indirectly drives migration outcomes.41
Demonstrating that climate change causes migration requires two causal
links: i) a link between climate change and a particular environmental event,
and ii) a link between an environmental event and the decision to move.42 Yet it
remains challenging to establish either of the two necessary causal links.
First, although modest advances in attribution science have allowed for
increased precision in connecting a single environmental event to climate
change impacts, the science is still evolving.43 Second, empirical studies have
shown that many other factors play into the decision to move or stay.44 Eco-
nomic, social, and political drivers shape migration alongside climate change.45
Furthermore, economic factors play a larger role in determining migration out-
comes than environmental drivers at both the individual and structural level.46
Given that migration requires access to financial resources, at a minimum for
travel costs and fees, socioeconomic status shapes who has access to migration
as an adaptation strategy.47 Economic development and infrastructure quality
also shape migration outcomes.48 Even when noting that climate change im-
40. KÄLIN, supra note 37, at 13–17. R
41. Jon Barnett & W. Neil Adger, Mobile Worlds: Choice at the Intersection of Demographic and
Environmental Change, 43 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RES. 246, 255 (2018).
42. BENOÎT MAYER, CONCEPT OF CLIMATE MIGRATION ADVOCACY AND ITS PROSPECTS
17–26 (2016).
43. See generally Geert Jan van Oldenborgh et al., Attribution of Extreme Rainfall from Hurricane
Harvey, August 2017, 12 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 124009 (2017) (demonstrating that attribu-
tion science has improved by showing that climate change increased rainfall associated with
Hurricane Harvey by 15%); Pardeep Pall et al., Diagnosing Conditional Anthropogenic Contri-
butions to Heavy Colorado Rainfall in September 2013, 17 WEATHER & CLIMATE EX-
TREMES 1, 1 (2017).
44. DOMINIC KNIVETON ET AL., IOM, CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION 6 (2008).
45. See generally SARAH HARPER, GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., FORESIGHT, MIGRATION AND
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (2011).
46. See JON BARNETT & MICHAEL WEBBER, ACCOMMODATING MIGRATION TO PROMOTE
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (World Bank, Policy Working Paper No. 5270,
2010).
47. David Hodgkinson et al., ‘The Hour When the Ship Comes In’: A Convention for Persons Dis-
placed by Climate Change, 36 MONASH U. L. REV. 69, 82 n.91 (2010).
48. See Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent, Overcoming the Legal Impasse?, in ‘CLIMATE REFU-
GEES,’ supra note 35, at 3–4 (describing the effect of drought in Haiti versus California). R
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pacts contributed to their decisions to move, climate migrants cite a range of
other factors.49 Climate-induced migration is thus multi-causal.
The multidimensional nature of climate-induced migration has made gov-
erning and operationalizing legal responsibility for cross-border climate-in-
duced migration, in particular, difficult.50 Former Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights and the Environment John Knox proposes legal responsibility in
the aggregate, claiming that “the difficulty of tracing causal chains is not neces-
sarily in itself an insuperable barrier to . . . an allocation [of legal responsibility],
at least at an aggregate level,” because of the established causal links between
state emissions, climate change, and impacts.51 Furthermore, despite climate-
induced migration’s multi-causal nature, climate change still does factor into
migration decision-making.52 Thus it is appropriate that significant develop-
ments in the governance structure for climate-induced migration have emerged
over the past five years.
B. Governance Structure
The governance framework for climate-induced migration has grown sig-
nificantly in the past decade, with critical developments within the last five
years. Although there remains no common definition of a migrant, no binding
multilateral convention governing migration, and an overlapping constellation
of bilateral and regional migration instruments,53 advances in the international
migration governance framework have cemented the importance of interna-
tional migration on the international agenda, and made international migration
management more coherent.
The IOM serves as the lead U.N. agency responsible for handling migra-
tion matters. Established in 1951, the IOM became affiliated with the U.N. in
49. See, e.g., ROBERT OAKES ET AL., U.N. UNIV., CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION IN
THE PACIFIC 2 (2015).
50. The majority of climate-induced migration occurs within national borders, but some climate
migrants are forced to move abroad. See id.
51. John H. Knox, Human Rights Principles and Climate Change, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 213, 225 n.20 (Kevin R. Gray et al. eds.,
2016). The United States and China are responsible for more than 40% of global carbon
dioxide emissions. Sean Fleming, These Countries Create Most of the World’s CO2 Emissions,
WORLD ECON. F. (June 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZX49-VJJU.
52. For example, in a study by the U.N. University, 23% of emigrating I-Kiribati and 8% of
migrants from Tuvalu identified environmental stressors as the reason for migrating. OAKES
ET AL., supra note 49; see also Burkett, supra note 39, at 78 (arguing for maintaining an R
emphasis on climate’s role in climate-induced migration).
53. See Elizabeth Ferris, Governance and Climate Change-Induced Mobility: International and Re-
gional Frameworks, in CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 11, 19–20
(Dimitra Manou et al. eds., 2017).
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2016.54 IOM covers a wide-ranging migration portfolio, including border man-
agement, migrant health, forced displacement related to conflict and disaster,
and economic migration.55 The IOM aims to fulfil three major objectives re-
lated to environmental and climate-induced migration: i) prevent forced migra-
tion in the context of environmental and climate change; ii) “assist, protect and
reduce” migrant vulnerability; and iii) support migration as an adaptation strat-
egy to climate change.56 The IOM conducts research and advocacy, aims to
advance legal protection, promotes policy dialogue, and builds policy-maker ca-
pacity to achieve these goals at the national, regional, and global levels.57
In 2015, the IOM created the Migration, Environment and Climate
Change Division in response to Member States’ desire to highlight the impor-
tance of climate-induced migration on the international policy agenda.58 The
IOM’s growing member base, especially among countries impacted by climate-
induced migration such as small island developing states (“SIDS”) and least-
developed countries, also points to increased prominence of climate-induced
migration on the global stage.59 A number of new members joined the organi-
zation specifically because of their interest in climate-induced migration.60 The
IOM reports that financial support from developed countries to implement cli-
mate-induced migration projects also underscores engagement with the issue
from all sides of the aisle.61
The office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”)
serves as another U.N. agency relevant to climate-induced migration govern-
ance. UNHCR is the agency responsible for refugees as defined by the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Refugee Convention”).62
While climate migrants generally do not fall under the auspices of the 1951
Refugee Convention, UNHCR has supported the development of soft law and
policy related to climate-induced migration.63 UNHCR participates in the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).
UNHCR also led the consultative process that resulted in the GCR, a frame-
54. Press Release, IOM, Summit on Refugees and Migrants Opens as IOM Joins United Na-
tions (Sept. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/8RA7-DR52.
55. See Mariam Traore Chazalnoel & Dina Ionesco, Advancing the Global Governance of Climate
Migration through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Global Compact on Migration, in ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES,’ supra note 35, at 103–04. R
56. See id. at 104.
57. See id.




62. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter
1951 Refugee Convention].
63. See UNHCR, PART II: GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES 2, U.N. Doc. A/73/12 (Part II)
(2018).
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work for sustainably and equitably managing refugee flows.64 The GCR recog-
nizes that forced displacement can result from sudden-onset disasters, although
the framework falls short of recognizing climate change as an independent
driver of migration and displacement, unlike its counterpart, the Global Com-
pact.65 Indeed, UNHCR has played a modest role in managing climate-induced
migration thus far, although it may do so to a greater degree in the future.66
Besides U.N. agencies, a number of state-led and international processes
advance climate-induced migration on the international agenda. The Nansen
Initiative, established in 2012 as an intergovernmental initiative led by Norway
and Switzerland, formalized the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border
Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (“Nansen
Protection Agenda”) in 2015. The Nansen Protection Agenda synthesizes re-
search and data on cross-border displacement and recommends policy mecha-
nisms for reducing the vulnerability of displaced persons. The agenda was
endorsed by 109 governments, signaling the Nansen Initiative’s success, and the
Platform on Disaster Displacement (“PDD”) was launched as the Nansen Initi-
ative’s successor in July 2016 by Germany and Bangladesh.67
Multilateral agreements that recognize the climate change and migration
nexus have also emerged over the last decade. Within the UNFCCC frame-
work, human mobility related to climate change was first recognized in the
Cancun Adaptation Framework in 2010.68 The landmark Paris Agreement
built on this foundation within the UNFCCC, establishing in 2015 the Task
Force on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss
and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts to address climate-in-
64. See id. at 1.
65. See id. at 2; see also G.A. Res. 73/195, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migra-
tion, at 13 (Dec. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Global Compact].
66. See Ferris, supra note 53, at 15 (arguing that UNHCR will logically be called upon to play a R
more active role in climate-induced migration management in the future).
67. See Jane McAdam, From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shap-
ing International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, 39 U. NEW S.
WALES L.J. 1518 (2016) for an account of the PDD’s development. Other state-led policy
processes that link climate change and migration and displacement, include the Global Fo-
rum on Migration and Development, Migrants in Countries in Crisis initiative, Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, World Humanitarian Summit, United Nations
Environment Assembly, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, and Cli-
mate Vulnerable Forum. The Peninsula Principles, developed by international experts in
2013, provide another normative framework that guides nation-states in their response to
climate-induced migration.
68. UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, ¶ 14(f), U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add. 1 (Mar. 15, 2011) (inviting parties to enhance action on ad-
aptation by developing “[m]easures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation
with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation”).
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duced migration.69 The Global Compact crystallized this momentum, recogniz-
ing climate change as a unique migration driver in 2018.70
The Global Compact, the first international cooperative agreement on mi-
gration signed by over 160 countries, evolved from the New York Declaration.71
All 193 United Nations Member States adopted the New York Declaration in
order to improve the international community’s response to an unprecedented
number of refugee and migrant flows,72 which has led to death when un-
managed.73 The Global Compact recommends regular migration opportunities
including humanitarian visas, private sponsorships, and temporary work per-
mits as levers to ensure that migration becomes an experience of dignity rather
than an act of despair for climate migrants.74 The promotion of regular migra-
tion pathways signals a dramatic departure from contemporary state approaches
to migration, which have relied heavily on exclusion. I turn to the impact of the
right to exclude on climate-induced migration next.
C. The Protection Gap
A protection gap exists for migrants displaced across international borders
by climate-related events, arising from the fact that international law does not
confer a general right of entry75—although international law does prohibit non-
69. UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-first Session, ¶ 49, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add. 1. (Jan. 29, 2016).
70. Global Compact, supra note 65, ¶ 18. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is R
another international agreement that recognizes the climate change migration nexus. See
Third U.N. World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (Mar. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/T628-FKSR.
71. See New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, supra note 11, at Annex II (launching R
process towards the achievement of a global compact on safe, orderly, and regular migration
in 2018). See also Global Compact for Migration, IOM, https://perma.cc/XT8T-NCGE.
72. The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions,
UNHCR, https://perma.cc/S9JG-QKYU.
73. See, e.g., Helena Smith, Shocking Images of Drowned Syrian Boy Show Tragic Plight of Refu-
gees, GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015), https://perma.cc/9H3H-569R.
74. Global Compact, supra note 65, ¶ 21. The Global Compact names protection measures that R
some nation-states already practice. For example, New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category
offers permanent residence to 250 citizens from Fiji, 250 from Tonga, 75 from Tuvalu, and
75 from Kiribati if they have an offer of employment in New Zealand and meet specified
language, income, health, and character requirements. See Pacific Access Category Resident
Visa, N.Z. IMMIGR., https://perma.cc/7UJT-7XKZ.
75. The lack of a right of entry except for certain exempted categories of persons can be concom-
itantly described as the sovereign right to exclude. On matters of entry and exclusion, the
predominant belief in international law is that these matters fall within the reserved domain
of domestic jurisdiction. See GUY GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 94 (1978). See infra Part II for further discus-
sion of the right to exclude.
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admission of refugees.76 When displacement occurs across borders, then, cli-
mate migrants find themselves with no right to enter another nation-state, re-
main there, or be protected against forcible return.77 Instead, the status of these
climate migrants is dependent upon the “generosity of host countries.”78 The
only situation in which international law may allow for admission of climate
migrants occurs when climate change combines with established grounds for
protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention.79
Climate scholars have responded to this protection gap by arguing for the
inclusion of climate migrants in international refugee law, the development of
new multilateral instruments, and the creation of heretofore unimagined legal
devices.80 The 1951 Refugee Convention’s definition of a refugee, that is, a
person with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, currently
does not apply to climate migrants for two reasons.81 First, the narrow grounds
76. Kälin, supra note 35, at 94. International law only mandates that states protect three catego- R
ries of forced migrants: refugees, stateless persons, and those entitled to complementary pro-
tection. Most scholars agree that climate migrants fall outside the protection of international
refugee law and cannot be defined as stateless persons under the Convention Relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons. See McAdam, supra note 29, at 2–8. Furthermore, no interna- R
tional decision-making body has yet confirmed the extension of the non-refoulement principle
to those fleeing disaster. Id.
77. Kälin, supra note 35, at 86–91. This protection gap is less acute in the context of sudden- R
onset disasters because migration tends to be internal and temporary. When migrants are
displaced within borders by sudden- or slow-onset events, their human rights remain pro-
tected by international and domestic law. See Dimitra Manou & Anja Mihr, Climate Change,
Migration, and Human Rights, in CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 53, at 3–4. R
78. Kälin, supra note 35, at 90. R
79. Id. at 92 (arguing that in situations where climate change interacts with conflict, refugee law,
human rights law, and international humanitarian law properly applies). In the final category
of climate-induced migration, planned relocation, government-driven relocation tends to oc-
cur within national borders, where the absence of an international right of entry remains
irrelevant. However, if people subject to planned relocation reject their relocation sites or
find them inadequate, their legal status will remain indeterminate. Id. at 91.
80. The calls for reform of international refugee law were, in some cases, state-backed. The
Bangladeshi Finance Minister before the Copenhagen climate change conference pushed for
the revision of the 1951 Refugee Convention to include climate migrants. See Harriet Grant
et al., UK Should Open Borders to Climate Refugees Says Bangladeshi Minister, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 4, 2009), https://perma.cc/MQP4-X5U4. The Maldives made a similar proposal in
2006. McAdam, supra note 28, at 6. Some work insists on refugee law as a useful protection R
framework. See generally SANJULA WEERASINGHE, IN HARM’S WAY: INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF NEXUS DYNAMICS BETWEEN CONFLICT OR VIO-
LENCE AND DISASTER OR CLIMATE CHANGE (2018). Others propose relying on national,
bilateral, and regional frameworks to fill the protection gap. See, e.g., McAdam, supra note
29, at 9. R
81. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 62, art. 1(A)(2). Refugees must also be unwilling to R
avail themselves of the protection of their home countries according to the definition. Id. Yet
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for persecution hinders the application of the 1951 Refugee Convention.82 Per-
secution typically requires human agency, which climate impacts do not sat-
isfy.83 Second, fleeing a climate-related disaster does not trigger any
Convention ground, that is, race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.84
Despite academic accounts of international refugee law that would include cli-
mate migrants,85 to date, the 1951 Refugee Convention has not been applied to
climate-induced migration.86
Using the 1951 Refugee Convention as an imaginative launching point,
scholars have also advanced proposals for new multilateral governance
frameworks for climate-induced migration. The most prominent of these, pro-
posed by Biermann and Boas, Docherty and Giannini, and Hodgkinson et al.,
countries facing severe climate impacts often do engage in active efforts to reduce climate-
related harm. This has served as another justification for excluding climate migrants from
the protection of international refugee law. See, e.g., Teitiota v. Chief Executive [2015] NZSC
107 (N.Z.) (deciding that the 1951 Refugee Convention did not apply to an I-Kiribati seek-
ing refuge in New Zealand due to climate change impacts in part because “there is no evi-
dence that the Government of Kiribati is failing to take steps to protect its citizens from the
effects of environmental degradation to the extent that it can”).
82. See, e.g., Teitiota [2015] NZSC 107 (N.Z.).
83. McAdam, supra note 29, at 4. R
84. Id. at 5.
85. See, e.g., Heather Alexander & Jonathan Simon, Unable to Return in the 1951 Convention:
Stateless Refugees and Climate Change, 26 FLA. J. INT’L L. 531, 533–34 (2014) (proposing
that the 1951 Refugee Convention’s language “unable to return” encompasses those fleeing
climate-related events).
86. McAdam, supra note 29, at 5. The U.N. Human Rights Committee ruled in January 2020 R
that countries may have their non-refoulement obligations triggered if climate impacts worsen
in the future and result in violations of the right to life under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. The decision represents the most generous articulation a U.N.
body has made on the protection international refugee and human rights law owes to climate
migrants. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Views Adopted by the Committee Under
Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (Sept. 23, 2020). However, regional bodies have ex-
panded the refugee definition in a way that may apply to cross-border climate migrants. The
1969 Organization of African Unity Convention extends protection to persons fleeing be-
cause of “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing
public order.” African Union, Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa art. 1, Sept. 10, 1969. Kenya, Ethiopia, and other East African countries mobilized
the convention to accept 300,000 Somali refugees fleeing drought. Interview by Sabine Balk
with Walter Kälin, Envoy of the Chair, PDD (Apr. 2019), https://perma.cc/H6SS-SKE7.
The 1984 Cartagena Declaration’s definition similarly applies to those who move because
their “lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggres-
sion, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have
seriously disturbed public order.” Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in
Central America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees at III.3, Nov.
22, 1984. Significant climate events may be reasonably considered as a serious disturbance to
public order.
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each recommend a multilateral instrument tailored to the needs of climate mi-
grants. Biermann and Boas suggest a UNFCCC Protocol on “Recognition,
Protection and Resettlement of Climate Refugees,” while Hodgkinson et al.
propose a draft convention for climate migrants displaced internally and across
borders.87
Suggestions for a new convention or a protocol to the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention that would govern climate-induced migration have been met with cri-
tique. Wyman points to three problems with these proposals: i) a new
agreement that focuses solely on climate migrants would unethically privilege
them over those displaced by other factors like war or poverty;88 ii) it would be
necessary to isolate climate change as a driver in order to guarantee protection,
which is impractical;89 and iii) the political appetite required for a new agree-
ment remains lacking.90 Furthermore, Wyman sees these as responsive to a
rights gap, but unresponsive to the funding gap for climate-induced migra-
tion.91 McAdam adds that climate-induced migration will be mostly internal
and gradual, making a new multilateral treaty or protocol a distraction from
responses targeted towards the type of movement that will predominantly oc-
cur.92 Ultimately, the uptake of a new multilateral protection mechanism, in-
cluding a new protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, has failed.93
The challenges of climate-induced migration have also prompted calls for
entirely new legal constructs. International law, for example, does not provide
rules for preservation of nationality when climate change renders a state unin-
87. Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance
System to Protect Climate Refugees, 10 GLOB. ENV’T POL. 60, 64 (2010); Hodgkinson et al.,
supra note 47, at 69; see also Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: R
A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349
(2009) (proposing a multilateral treaty that addresses cross-border climate-induced
migration).
88. Katrina M. Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 167,
191–96 (2013).
89. Id. at 196–200. But see Maxine Burkett, Migration, in CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC
HEALTH, AND THE LAW 300, 304 (Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach eds., 2018) (arguing
that climate change may become a clearer causal factor as climate impacts worsen).
90. Wyman, supra note 88, at 200–02. R
91. Id. at 177, 181; see also Maxine Burkett, Lessons from Contemporary Resettlement in the South
Pacific, 68 COLUM. J. INT’L AFFS. 75 (2015) (discussing the difficulties of accessing climate
funding for planned relocation in the Carteret Islands).
92. McAdam, supra note 28, at 8. R
93. See Elin Jakobsson, Norm Formalization in International Policy Cooperation: A Framework for
Analysis, in ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES,’ supra note 35, at 61 (arguing that uptake of a new protec- R
tion mechanism in international law has failed because research has not clarified the ambigu-
ities of climate-induced migration, key figures have not championed a new instrument, and
there is insufficient political will).
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habitable but no successor state follows, as could be the case with some SIDS.94
In response to this novel situation, Burkett proposes a new structure for the
nation state—the nation ex situ—whereby a governance structure based on a
trusteeship system would steward a dispersed population.95
The climate-induced migration protection gap demonstrates the need to
reconstruct international legal doctrine to account for contemporary migration.
The extent to which nation-states enjoy a right to exclude pits sovereign rights
against migrant rights. In the current era, marked by increased human mobility
exacerbated in some cases by transnational harms like climate change impacts,
this constructed opposition is untenable. The next part narrows in on the his-
tory of the right to exclude and contemporary justifications for this key legal
doctrine, which structures migration outcomes.
II. THE CONSTITUTION OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH EXCLUSION
Contemporary sovereignty is constituted in part by nation-states’ exercise
of the right to exclude, which creates a protection gap in regard to cross-border
climate-induced migration. This Part provides an account of the right to ex-
clude as well as the discriminatory history of the doctrine. It then reviews the
liberal defense of the doctrine and argues that the constitution of sovereignty
through exclusion needs to shift. Thus, this Part lays the groundwork to ask
who has the power to change international legal norms.
A. Sovereignty Constructed Through the Right to Exclude
Sovereignty refers to the “totality of international rights and duties recog-
nized by international law as residing in [the] independent territorial unit,” that
is, the nation-state.96 Sovereignty, both presupposed and produced by the exer-
94. Maxine Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ, 2 CLIMATE L. 345, 354 (2011); see also Jane Mc-
Adam, ‘Disappearing States,’ Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law, in CLI-
MATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT, supra note 35, at 105–06 (arguing that loss of R
population might signal the first erosion of statehood rather than loss of territory as islands
will become uninhabitable before they disappear). The four elements of statehood include
permanent population, effective government, capacity to enter into relations with other
states, and defined territory. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 165 L.N.T.S.
19 (1933). The IPCC recently reported that atoll islands could be rendered uninhabitable at
1.5°C of warming above pre-industrial levels. See IPCC, 1.5°C REPORT, supra note 22. R
95. Burkett, supra note 94, at 363–71. Burkett also argues that the special case of disappearing R
Pacific island states may challenge the Westphalian notion of the nation-state, which takes
territory as one of its bases. Id. at 354. Other proposals for addressing this unprecedented
situation include the cession of territory, purchasing land, merger, and trading exclusive eco-
nomic zones for new territory. See LILIAN YAMAMOTO & MIGUEL ESTEBAN, ATOLL IS-
LAND STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 188–91, 200–01 (2014).
96. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (2d ed.
2006) (providing the most common definition of sovereignty).
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cise of these rights and duties, exclusion key among them, is plastic.97 In exer-
cising the right to exclude—that is, the right to limit entry into their territorial
borders by choosing not to admit aliens or place conditions on their admis-
sion98—nation-states assume and reproduce shared norms about what it means
to be sovereign.99 Simply, there is no sovereignty without an “other”.100
International law does limit the sovereign’s right to exclude aliens in cer-
tain instances.101 Refugee and human rights law constrains nation-states’ ability
to reject foreign nationals at the border where flight was prompted by certain
forms of persecution,102 or return would result in torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, punishment, and other irreparable harm.103 While inter-
national human rights law grants the right of freedom of movement,104 there is
97. See Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52
STAN. L. REV. 959, 966 (2000). For other constructivist accounts of sovereignty see STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds.,
1996); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003).
98. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 608
(8th ed. 2012).
99. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,
46 INT’L ORG. 391, 413 (1992).
100. Id. at 412. Political theorists explain the constitutive relationship between sovereignty and
the right to exclude via the political community. The nation-state’s ability to determine who
belongs and who does not, and therefore establish an insider political community, is a defin-
ing feature of its authority. Roxanne Lynn Doty, Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the
Boundaries of National Identity, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 121, 122
(Steve Smith et al. eds., 1996).
101. Nation-states can also opt into granting rights of entry via treaty. The growth of human
rights law and the expansion of FMAs limit the right to exclude. See Sara Iglesias Sánchez,
Free Movement of Persons and Regional International Organisations, in ISSUES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL MIGRATION LAW 223, 223 (Richard Plender ed., 2015).
102. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 62. R
103. The international refugee and human rights law principle of non-refoulement bars nation-
states from returning aliens where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of
their race, religion, or political or social affiliation. Id. art. 33(1); see generally Sir Elihu Lau-
terpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement:
Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (Erika Feller et al. eds.,
2003).
104. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights bans nation-states from prohibiting
movement within their own borders or denying re-entry to any national. The declaration
also grants everyone the right to leave any country, including their own. G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights takes a more restrictive stance,
noting that the right of freedom of movement can be restricted on the grounds of national
security, public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. G.A.
Res. 2200A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
2200A (Dec. 16, 1966); see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 75, at 136–37 (noting that a R
State must re-admit its own nationals, even in cases where they were lawfully expelled by
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no guaranteed right of entry.105 Thus, ironically, we are all promised the right to
move, but promised nowhere to move to.
This asymmetry of movement rights finds its basis in historical and con-
temporary constructions of sovereignty. Although free movement characterized
most human migration before the late nineteenth century, by the end of the
nineteenth century, international law began analogizing between territorial sov-
ereignty and the ownership of land.106 The analogy posits that nation-states,
like private property owners, have a right to deny admission to aliens seeking
entry into their territory.107 As Emmerich de Vattel, author of the eminent in-
ternational law treatise The Law of Nations, writes, “since the lord of the terri-
tory may, whenever he thinks proper, forbid its being entered . . . he has no
doubt a power to annex what conditions he pleases to the permission to
enter.”108 The Westphalian notion of the nation-state, which hardened territo-
rial borders, underpinned the rise of the right to exclude.109 Today, the right to
exclude functions as the bedrock of the international law of migration, built on
the principle of sovereignty.110
But the notion that territorial sovereignty and immigration restrictions go
hand in hand is not natural.111 A suite of critical scholars have chipped away at
the notion that the right to exclude rests on legitimate legal authority, and
another State). The extranationalization of border control policies may undercut the right to
leave any state. See COUNCIL OF EUR. COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., THE RIGHT TO LEAVE A
COUNTRY 7 (2013) (describing the EU’s externalization of border control policies as
problematic).
105. See Christopher Wellman, Freedom of Movement and the Right to Enter & Exit, in MIGRA-
TION IN POLITICAL THEORY 80, 91 (Sarah Fine & Lea Ypi eds., 2016). Climate scholars
have pointed out this asymmetry in international law. See generally ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES,’
supra note 35. R
106. See James Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L
L. 804, 809 (1983); see also Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 661 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (articu-
lating the pre-twentieth century practice of generous admission: “The policy of our nation
has always been to bestow the right of citizenship freely, and with a liberality unknown to
the old world.”); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 96, at 48 (noting that the analogy between R
private landowners and nation-states was of limited value even in the era of colonialism). To
be clear, this Article does not make a case for open borders, although it does recommend
liberalizing borders through regional measures such as FMAs. See infra Part IV.A.
107. Vincent Chetail, Sovereignty and Migration in the Doctrine of the Law of Nations: An Intellec-
tual History of Hospitality from Vitoria to Vattel, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 901, 902 (2017); see also
Wyman, supra note 88, at 195–96 (deconstructing the analogy by pointing to restrictions on R
private property owners).
108. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 312 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds.,
2008).
109. Nafziger, supra note 106, at 810. R
110. Ferris, supra note 53, at 11–12. R
111. See Chetail, supra note 107, at 922. R
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pointed to the discriminatory origins of the doctrine.112 As Nafziger puts it, “the
sovereign’s right to exclude aliens is simply a maxim” based on Anglo-American
case law from 1889 to 1893, selective quotes from Vattel, excerpts of nineteenth
century U.S. diplomatic correspondence, and “black letter pronouncements ap-
parently rendered ex cathedra by earlier publicists.”113 Immigration controls only
cropped up at the turn of the twentieth century.114 Munshi frames the rise of
immigration controls in the United States as a response to Asian immigrants so
that now “invented notions of territorial belonging have become natural or self-
evident, rendering immigrant exclusion and the relative immobility of racialized
populations” seemingly natural.115
Anglo-American case law that articulated the right to exclude at the turn
of the century has continued relevance in jurisprudence today.116 The U.S. Su-
preme Court first held that Congress has plenary authority to exclude aliens in
the context of racial discrimination.117 In Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The
Chinese Exclusion Case),118 the Court upheld the constitutionality of an 1888
federal statute that prohibited the admission of Chinese nationals. The 1888
statute was an expression of anti-Chinese sentiment that motivated a series of
federal laws and treaties, including the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882119 and
112. See id.; Nafziger, supra note 106; Sherally Munshi, Immigration, Imperialism, and the Legacies R
of Indian Exclusion, 28 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 51 (2016). These scholars make a move similar
to that made by critical legal scholars by showing how the law naturalizes a social order
instead of itself being natural. See KHIARA BRIDGES, CRITICAL RACE THEORY 26 (2019).
113. Nafziger, supra note 106, at 807. Nafziger goes on to give a historical explanation, noting R
that the proposition of exclusion arose when American and other frontiers were disappearing
and Europeans and the Orient were migrating to the U.S. and the British Empires. Along
with a wave of positivism, this led the “nativistic pronouncements of courts” to become
“engraved in stone.” Id. at 808.
114. Chetail, supra note 107, at 922. With the advent of World War I, early nation-state limita- R
tions on admission began to shift away from presumed admission, where nation-states de-
nied aliens entry only if the migrant posed a threat. See AOIFE MCMAHON, THE ROLE OF
THE STATE IN MIGRATION CONTROL 7 (2017). During World War I, the United States
and later Europe adopted the stance that admission would be barred “unless we want you.”
Id. Although such exclusion served as a war-time emergency measure, the flipped presump-
tion became permanent. But see Nafziger, supra note 106, at 816 (Nafziger proposes that R
Western nation-states’ adoption of increasingly restrictive immigration measures arose with
the death of the frontier at the end of the nineteenth century. For example, the United
States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada limited migration from Asian countries at the
end of the nineteenth century. These measures became the basis for the “landmark judicial
decisions that upheld exclusionary laws.”).
115. Sherally Munshi, Race, Geography, and Mobility, 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 245, 250 (2016).
116. Nafziger, supra note 106, at 807–08. R
117. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
118. See id.
119. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58–59 (establishing the Chi-
nese certificate requirements and suspending Chinese immigration for a decade).
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1884.120 The Court based its holding on the right to exclude, framing “[t]he
power of exclusion of foreigners,” as “being an incident of sovereignty belong-
ing to the government of the United States” such that it “cannot be granted
away or restrained on behalf of anyone.”121
The Supreme Court went on to further articulate the right to exclude for
the United States, and indeed much of the modern world, in Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States122 in 1892.123 Citing Vattel, the Court declared that:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign na-
tion has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its domin-
ions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as
it may see fit to prescribe.124
However, the Court’s position derives from a misreading of Vattel.125 Unlike
the Court’s framing of the right to exclude as absolute, Vattel framed the right
as qualified.126 For example, Vattel counseled that individuals have a right to
procure provisions “when a foreign nations [sic] refuses them a just assis-
tance.”127 Yet misinterpretations of Vattel’s work combined with nineteenth-
century positivism conditioned U.S. and British judicial decisions to uphold the
exclusion of aliens, which then became authority cited worldwide.128
The U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld the logic of exclusion in Trump
v. Hawaii,129 a case rejecting a challenge to Donald Trump’s Executive Order
13,769 that restricted immigration for nationals of six predominantly Muslim
countries.130 The Court again asserted that “the admission and exclusion of for-
eign nationals” is a fundamental sovereign right of the government’s political
branch, shielded from “judicial control.”131 Framing the admission and exclu-
120. H.R. Res. 1798, 48th Cong., 23 Stat. 115 (1884) (enacted) (requiring a certificate for entry
of Chinese nationals into the United States).
121. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
122. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
123. See Nafziger, supra note 106, at 826. R
124. 142 U.S. at 659.
125. See Nafziger, supra note 106, at 826 for an analysis of the Court’s erroneous interpretation of R
Vattel’s position.
126. See Munshi, supra note 115, at 259–60. R
127. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 178 (Edward Ingraham & Joseph Chitty
eds., 1883).
128. Nafziger, supra note 106, at 823. R
129. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
130. Id. at 2418 (“For more than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and
exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Govern-
ment’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977)(1)).
131. Id.
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sion of foreign nationals in terms of separation of powers, the Court’s reasoning
points to how deeply embedded the right to exclude remains in contemporary
renderings of U.S. law.
Yet the right to exclude not only serves to justify federal immigration law
and policy with discriminatory effect, the doctrine’s continued operation also
ignores the racialized history that underpins this jurisprudence.132 If the right to
exclude rests on such a questionable foundation, why does it persist? I analyze
contemporary defenses of the right to exclude next.
B. Contemporary Justifications for the Right to Exclude
The right to exclude plays a central role in the contemporary construction
of sovereignty. Two strands within liberal theory support the notion that con-
trol over territorial borders is determinative of sovereignty.133 First, liberal na-
tionalists, political theorists who attempt to wed national identity and liberal
values,134 defend the right to exclude as necessary to national self-determina-
tion.135 According to this line of argument, the nation-state mediates its na-
tional identity by controlling who may or may not enter its territory and thereby
join the national community.136 Generous admission policies would “change not
just the size, but to a greater or lesser extent the political complexion, of the
citizen body,”137 and result in “externally generated cultural change,”138 thus un-
dermining the nation-state’s right to self-determination. Therefore, the nation-
state’s interest in preserving its national identity justifies the right to exclude.139
Second, democratic theorists argue that democratic self-governance re-
quires being able to control borders. Contemporary democratic theory claims
that democratic self-rule necessarily includes exclusion, because democracy re-
quires a defined body of members, the demos, to engage in democratic deci-
132. See MCMAHON, supra note 114, at 7 (arguing that the widespread presumption “that the R
control of migration can be justified on a traditional basis . . . fails to appreciate this signifi-
cant turning point or the racist origins of such measures”).
133. See E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1525 (2019).
134. See Sara Amighetti & Alasia Nuti, A Nation’s Right to Exclude and the Colonies, 44 POL.
THEORY 541, 561 n.10 (2016).
135. See id. at 545.
136. See id.
137. David Miller, Is There a Human Right to Immigrate?, in MIGRATION IN POLITICAL THE-
ORY, supra note 105, at 29 (emphasis added). R
138. Id. at 29.
139. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 38–39 (1999); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 51 (1983); see also DAVID MILLER,
STRANGERS IN OUR MIDST: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMMIGRATION 26–29
(2016) (explaining the value of national identity, and claiming that a commitment to pre-
serving national identity bears on admission policies).
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sion-making.140 Thus, “the legal exclusion of some individuals from the people
is constitutive of the procedures required for democratic legitimacy.”141 The de-
mos, in other words, must be bounded,142 an effect that nation-states achieve by
exercising the right to exclude.
Yet establishing “the boundaries of the demos . . . is one the most vexing
theoretical problems in liberal-democratic theory.”143 Although international
law has been marked by a posture of openness in other regards, trade, for exam-
ple, the ‘closed’ nation-state still serves as the “primary vehicle for the collective
self-determination of political communities.”144 However, as Jennifer Gordon
has quipped, “people are not bananas.”145 Unlike capital and goods, migrants
can acquire legal rights and protections in liberal states, including social or wel-
fare rights and political or voting rights.146
The tension between markets, which would counsel for open migration
policies, and rights, which liberals claim demand closure, results in a “liberal
paradox.”147 Hollifield writes, “Rules of the market require openness and factor
mobility; but rules of the liberal polity, especially citizenship, require some de-
gree of closure . . . to have a clear definition of the citizenry and to protect the
sanctity of the social contract—the legal cornerstone of every liberal polity.”148
Although borders have been liberalized to facilitate the trade of goods and ser-
vices, national self-determination and democratic interest continue to justify
the nation-state’s right to largely exclude foreigners. Taking a constructivist
view, sovereignty then becomes constituted by norms of exclusion.
Indeed, international constructivist scholars point to the fact that nation-
states are constituted through “commonly held philosophical principles, identi-
ties, norms of behavior, or shared terms of discourse.”149 The right to exclude is
140. Arash Abizadeh, On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary Prob-
lem, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 867, 876 (2012).
141. Id. at 878.
142. Id. International law does not require states to be democratic but similarly treats the right to
exclude as necessary to protecting a political community’s right to self-determination.
143. Seyla Benhabib, The End of the 1951 Refugee Convention? Dilemmas of Sovereignty, Territori-
ality, and Human Rights, 2 JUS COGENS 75, 92 (2020).
144. Achiume, supra note 133, at 1526. R
145. Jennifer Gordon, People Are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 1109 (2010).
146. James F. Hollifield, Migration, Trade, and the Nation-State: The Myth of Globalization, 3
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFFS. 595, 619 (1998).
147. Id. at 623.
148. Id.; see also Chantal Thomas, What Does the Emerging International Law of Migration Mean
for Sovereignty?, 14 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 392, 426 (2013) (acknowledging that alien
exclusion can follow rationally from “the terms of the social compact,” but calling attention
to the “competing and potentially irrational impulses behind exclusionary migration policy”).
149. MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 15 (1996).
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one such norm.150 In highlighting the central role of the right to exclude in the
character of the liberal state, liberal scholars helpfully point to the way in which
exclusion of foreigners constructs sovereignty.
Trump’s exposition on the reasons for U.S. withdrawal from the Global
Compact further exposes the constitutive process between sovereignty and ex-
clusion. Trump announced in front of the U.N. General Assembly:
We recognize the right of every nation in this room to set its own
immigration policy in accordance with its national interests, just as
we ask other countries to respect our own right to do the same—
which we are doing. That is one reason the United States will not
participate in the new Global Compact on Migration.151
Couching his statement in terms of respect for U.S. sovereignty, Trump further
noted that “[t]he United States is also working . . . to confront threats to sover-
eignty from uncontrolled migration.”152 Trump’s framing, far from a right-wing
deviation, mirrors international law’s framing of the relationship between sover-
eignty and exclusion.
By pinning sovereignty to the right to exclude foreigners, international law
sets up an opposition between the nation-state on the one hand and the alien
on the other; although sovereignty can be preserved even while nation-states
adopt more liberal admission policies, as will be later demonstrated through the
example of FMAs. The imagined threats to the nation-state that the right to
exclude enables then justify widespread migrant exclusion. But if the right to
exclude arose from a discriminatory past and continues to operate to that effect,
who has the power to change it? Part III addresses this question next.
III. WHO CREATES INTERNATIONAL LAW?
This Part takes as its starting point the reality of international legal doc-
trine that arose from a discriminatory past and asks who has the power to
change international law. First, I provide a traditional account of how interna-
tional law is made, based on the state-centric conception of international law
that privileges the nation-state as the center of theoretical inquiry. Next, I argue
that this state-centric focus misses the ways non-state actors participate in in-
150. See Nafziger, supra note 106, at 841 (describing state practice as conforming with a “qualified R
duty to admit some aliens under some circumstances” in determining whether the right to
exclude is customary international law).
151. Donald Trump, President, United States, Remarks to the 73rd Session of the U.N. General
Assembly (Sept. 25, 2018). Trump’s position is not new. See Kristin E. Heyer, International-
ized Borders: Immigration Ethics in the Age of Trump, 79 THEO. STUD. 146, 153 (2018)
(arguing that the “dangerously porous border” has “long shaped U.S. society’s collective
imagination”).
152. Trump, supra note 151. R
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ternational norm-creation, and that non-state actors have the power to shift
international legal doctrine because of international law’s constraint on the use
of force.
A. The State-Centric Account of Jurisgenesis
The predominant conception of international law presents it as a “collec-
tive expression of sovereign wills.”153 When Bentham first coined the term he
posited that international law comprised a body of legal rules, standards, and
norms applicable to sovereign state relations.154 Traditional definitions of inter-
national law continue to reproduce that state-centric notion, characterizing in-
ternational law as the set of rules regulating state behavior in their relations
with each other.155
The International Court of Justice’s (“ICJ’s”) construal of the sources of
international law accords with the state-centric conception, which credits states
as the only authoritative promulgators of law. According to the ICJ, public
international law is derived from primary and secondary sources. Primary
sources include i) treaties and ii) international custom.156 Treaties, written inter-
national agreements concluded between consenting states, create legal rights
and duties that serve as the basis for the majority of international law.157 Cus-
tomary international law originates from general practices that states accept as
law.158 Customary international law requires two elements: i) state practice and
ii) adherence to the practice because states perceive it to be law, thereby satisfy-
ing opinio juris.159 Secondary sources of international law include judicial deci-
sions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.160 While treaties and
international custom are the only formal sources of international law, subsidiary
153. Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 7 (1998). Schacter and others frame this conception as posi-
tivist, but positivists have critiqued international law as not being law at all. See, e.g., JOHN
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 129 (2d ed. 1861) (“It follows
from the foregoing reasons, that a so-called law set by general opinion is not a law in the
proper signification of the term.”).
154. M.W. Janis, Jeremey Bentham and the Fashioning of “International Law,” 78 AM. J. INT’L L.
405, 408–10 (1984).
155. Math Noortmann et al., Non State Actors, 77 INT’L L. ASS’N REPS. CONFS. 608, 610 (2016)
[hereinafter Non State Actors 2016]; see also REBECCA WALLACE & ANNE HOLLIDAY, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1, 1 (2006).
156. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1(a)–(b).
157. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(a), May 23, 1969, 155 U.N.T.S. 331
(defining a treaty as an “international agreement concluded between states in written form
and governed by international law”).
158. Id.
159. MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (7th ed. 2014).
160. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 114, art. 38, ¶ (1)(d). R
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sources contribute to the content and support the interpretation of primary
sources of law.161
However, contemporary international law constitutes a complex hybrid of
positive, customary, and soft law operating through and promoted by a range of
fora and transnational actors since the Cold War.162 In contrast to hard law,
which includes treaty law and international custom, soft law includes a range of
non-treaty agreements that are non-binding.163 Soft law has significantly sup-
ported the development of international environmental law.164 For example, the
1972 Stockholm Conference, the U.N. Environmental Program, and various
regional and non-governmental international organizations have all articulated
“soft law” norms based on state behavior that resulted in “hard” customary in-
ternational law.165
Indeed, soft law can function as a precursor to the development of interna-
tional customary law, if state practice is accompanied by opinio juris.166 Soft law
has considerable potential for shaping international migration law in particular
where divergent political interests interrupt multilateral efforts to develop hard
law.167 States may be more willing to enter into ambitious agreements where
there is no threat of legal sanction.
Contemporary international law has evolved not only in terms of its
sources, but also its promulgators. International lawmaking has shifted away
from the Westphalian model of jurisgenesis to include “new processes outside
traditional diplomatic channels and involving non-state actors,” the products of
which constitute “genuine legal rules.”168 Contemporary definitions of interna-
161. Non State Actors, supra note 155, at 619. General principles of law serve as another source of R
international law, although scholars debate its categorization as a primary or subsidiary
source. Id.
162. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 15, at 2630–31. R
163. Elizabeth Ferris, Soft Law, Migration and Climate Change Governance, 8 J. HUM. RTS. &
ENV’T 6, 12 (2017); see also SHAW, supra note 159, at 83–84. R
164. MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (7th ed. 2016).
165. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 420, 422–23.
166. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 83–84 (6th ed. 2008).
167. Ferris argues that soft law might be particularly effective in closing the protection gap for
cross-border climate migrants because soft law is nimbler and can appeal to states where
hard law might alienate hesitant state actors. Elizabeth Ferris, supra note 163, at 12–14; see R
also PDD, State-Led, Regional, Consultative Processes: Opportunities to Develop Legal
Frameworks on Disaster Displacement, in ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES,’ supra note 35, at 126, 137 R
(claiming that multilateral and/or bilateral agreements could serve as a basis for new norms
on migration and displacement).
168. Jean d’Aspremont, Cognitive Conflicts and the Making of International Law: From Empirical
Concord to Conceptual Discord in Legal Scholarship, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1119, 1120
(2013); see generally Peter M. R. Stirk, The Westphalian Model and Sovereign Equality, 38
REV. INT’L STUD. 641, 641–60 (2012) (describing the recent shift away from a state-centric
model of lawmaking).
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tional law thus prove more capacious than the traditional account that interna-
tional law is interstate law. Indeed, contemporary public international law
regulates the behavior of states, in addition to other entities that possess some
international legal personality “in their relations with each other, at any given
time.”169 I turn more fully to non-state actors’ ability to participate in the for-
mation of international legal norms next.
B. Non-State Actor Jurisgenesis
International scholars have historically centered the nation-state as the site
of theoretical inquiry, thereby missing the ways in which non-state actors can
and do influence international law.170 This Section draws on Robert Cover’s
framing of law as a normative universe to argue that non-state actors hold the
power to participate in international norm-making because of the absence of a
state monopoly of violence in the international realm. To make this claim, I
would like to begin by returning to an age-old contention, that is, the realist
contention that international law is not really law.
Realist scholars argue that international law cannot be enforced, is there-
fore not law, and accordingly does not matter.171 In response, international rela-
tions and legal scholars have sought to substantiate the fact that “almost all
nations observe all principles of international law and almost all of their obliga-
tions almost all of the time” by providing theoretical grounding for the fact of
state compliance.172 This compliance literature has followed three distinct
tracks.
First, rationalist international relations scholars posit that nation-states
comply with international law when it serves their own interests.173 Traditional
rational theorists use game theory to explain interstate cooperation.174 Accord-
ing to this model, nation-states pursue their interests with norms such as legal
169. WALLACE & HOLLIDAY, supra note 155, at 1 (referring principally to international organi- R
zations and individuals).
170. See Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 485 (2005) for a critique of the nation-state centered focus of interna-
tional legal scholarship, and an argument that state-centered inquiries miss the nuances of
norm dissemination and diffusion.
171. See AUSTIN, supra note 153, at 378 (presenting the classic argument that international law is R
not real law).
172. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
173. See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 15, at 2632. R
174. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of
International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345, 351 (1998); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, POWER
AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD (2002) (presenting a further
account of rational choice theory); Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma:
Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923, 923
(1985).
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rules factoring into nation-states’ rational decision-making.175 The fact that na-
tion-states comply with international law frequently without severe sanctions
leads rationalism proponent Oran Young to propose that “sanctions or even
threats to impose sanctions seldom constitute the most important determinant
of observed levels of compliance with institutionalized rights and rules.”176
Rather, a nation-state will comply with international law when the benefits of
doing so outweigh the costs, and breach when the costs of compliance outweigh
the benefits.177 Consequently, while international law may not be enforced
through sanction, in the rationalist view, self-interest can nonetheless explain
compliance with international law.
The second strand of compliance theory postulates that nation-states obey
international law if they are liberal. Liberal international relations theorists such
as Anne-Marie Slaughter point to empirical evidence that liberal democracies
rarely go to war with each other in order to argue that liberal states make law,
not war.178 Unlike rationalist theorists, liberal theorists assume that the primary
actors in the international system are individuals and groups rather than nation-
states because of their influence on national governments.179 Thus, a liberal ap-
proach to international law would first attend to relations among individuals
and groups, then state institutions in relation to those social actors,  and finally
focus on “inter-state interactions where nation-state preferences are a changing
function of individual and group interests as those interests are themselves de-
fined in domestic and transnational society.”180 Although liberal international
theorists consider the influence of individual actors on state preferences via a
democratic structure, the liberal approach does not explicitly leave space for
unrepresented actors, such as undocumented migrants, to exert pressure on in-
ternational law.
The third vein of compliance theory is constructivist. According to the
constructivist view of compliance, nation-states obey international rules “not
just because of sophisticated calculations about how compliance or noncompli-
ance will affect their interests, but because a repeated habit of obedience
remakes their interests so that they come to value rule compliance.”181 While
rationalist theorists argue that states comply with international law when it
serves their interests, constructivists treat national interest and identity as con-
175. See Kingsbury, supra note 174, at 351–52. R
176. ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 195 (1994).
177. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1860–71.
178. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L.
503, 504–05 (1995).
179. Id. at 508.
180. Id. at 516.
181. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 15, at 2634. R
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stituted by international rules and norms.182 Harold Koh leverages the construc-
tivist view to generate a theory of transnational legal process, whereby
international law is integrated into domestic law via a three part process of
interaction, interpretation, and internationalization.183 In Koh’s telling, nation-
states do not only conform to international law out of self-interest, identity, or
norm compliance; but also because they have internalized global norms into
domestic legal systems.184
Hathaway and Shapiro rebuke the realist claim that international law is
not law because it cannot be enforced by highlighting the use of nonviolent
sanctions.185 Hathaway and Shapiro re-cast the realist critique as containing two
interrelated objections: i) international law is not law because it is not enforced
through “the threat and exercise of physical coercion” (the “Brute Force Objec-
tion”),186 and ii) international law is not law because enforcement is not neces-
sarily carried out by the regime itself (the “Internality Objection”).187
Hathaway and Shapiro then oppose the realist attack by arguing that in-
ternational law is enforced via nonviolent mechanisms, which they call “out-
casting.”188 Hathaway and Shapiro claim that the realist critique of what
international law is not—a legal regime violently enforced by the regime it-
self—entirely misses that “international legal institutions use others (usually
states) to enforce their rules, and they typically deploy outcasting—denying in-
dividuals the benefits of social cooperation—rather than physical force.”189 Thus
Hathaway and Shapiro conclude that international law is law; it is simply en-
forced differently than modern domestic law.
While the lack of violent enforcement has been used both to challenge and
defend international law, I would like to introduce a new way to think about
the compliance question. The lack of violent enforcement in international law,
while relevant to the question of whether international law is law, also points to
an open epistemic space in which non-state actors can come to play an influen-
tial role in jurisgenesis. The lack of a state monopoly on violence in interna-
182. See Ngaire Woods, The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations, in EXPLAINING
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945 9, 26–27 (Ngaire Woods ed., 1996).
183. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 15, at 2602–03. R
184. Id. at 2634.
185. See Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and Interna-
tional Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011).
186. Id. at 267–68.
187. Id. at 264–67. Hathaway and Shapiro offer the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) as an
example. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body authorizes retaliation by state parties who
have been aggrieved by another state’s failure to comply with trade law principles. This is
external enforcement because nation-states, not the legal regime itself, enact sanctions. Id. at
307.
188. Id. at 258.
189. Id. at 302.
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tional law means that non-state actors may participate in legal norm creation
without having to consider the same threat of nation-state violence.
Here, Cover’s seminal framing of the law as constitutive of a normative
universe, a nomos, is particularly useful.190 Cover, in his essay, Nomos and Narra-
tive, presents the law as embedded in narrative, and “not merely a system of
rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.”191 This normative universe is
as real as energy, mass, and momentum, with law acting like the force of grav-
ity, the normative worlds it creates influencing,192 and indeed colliding against
each other.193 The stakes are both physical and epistemic.
In describing the process by which the law generates normative reality,
Cover hinges his theory on legal interpretation: communities compete to estab-
lish their divergent narratives on the meaning a legal text creates, which then
forms the basis of a normative world.194 Because there is always a “multiplicity
of meaning—the fact that never only one but always many worlds are created
by the too fertile forces of jurisgenesis,” imperialism becomes necessary.195
Communities must compete to impose their normative worldview upon others.
The nation-state enjoys an advantage in this contest; its monopoly on violence
allows it to enforce its own interpretive meaning, while other communities
must always consider the nation-state’s resistance when fighting to create alter-
native legal meaning.196
Yet in the international legal realm, the nation-state does not enjoy the
same monopoly on violence as it does in the domestic realm. Although the legal
regime promulgated by European states sanctioned and rewarded war from the
seventeenth through to the twentieth centuries, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact
introduced a new world order in international law.197 In this new world order,
190. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–6 (1983).
191. Id. at 4–5.
192. Id. at 10.
193. Other scholars have pointed to the normative contest at play regarding the law’s meaning.
Monica Bell, for example, offers a theory of legal estrangement to articulate the tension
between black and poor communities and the U.S. legal system. See Monica C. Bell, Police
Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2054 (2017) (defin-
ing legal estrangement as “a theory of detachment and eventual alienation from the law’s
enforcers [which] reflects the intuition among many people in poor communities of color
that the law operates to exclude them from society”).
194. See Cover, supra note 190, at 5. R
195. Id. at 16. Cover famously describes the relationship between law and violence as one where
“legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.” Robert M. Cover, Violence and
the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (footnote omitted).
196. See Cover, supra note 190, at 52–53 (“The state’s claims over legal meaning are, at bottom, so R
closely tied to the state’s imperfect monopoly over the domain of violence that the claim of a
community to an autonomous meaning must be linked to the community’s willingness to
live out its meaning in defiance.”).
197. See generally OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS:
HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2017) for a history of
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war, including the spoils of war, became illegitimate. The 1945 Charter of the
U.N. enshrines this principle of nonviolence, prohibiting the use of force by
member states with limited exceptions.198 Furthermore, modern international
law does not have an enforcement apparatus that depends on violence akin to
an army or police force, perhaps locating international legal interpretation
outside “a field of pain and death.”199 Thus, in theory, non-state actors have an
opportunity to participate in international legal jurisgenesis, where their influ-
ence is more tightly constrained in domestic lawmaking.200
Indeed, a growing body of literature highlights the contribution non-state
actors make to international law.201 Hollis claims that non-state actors ranging
from international organizations to individuals contribute to the creation of in-
ternational law.202 Olivier argues that international legal theory should assess
the normative role of non-state actors in an international legal rule-making
process that now centers only nation-states.203 The International Law Associa-
tion considered whether “ascension of non-state actors could bring about more
radical changes of international law,”204 and concluded that non-state actors
can, at very least, engage in norm creation.205
Empirical evidence also points to the pluralization of international law-
making.206 Although non-state actors have been participating in international
violence in international law, with particular attention to the Kellogg-Briand Pact’s role in
ushering in a new world order where the use of force was outlawed in international law.
198. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). Articles 24
and 25 grant the Security Council the power to authorize collective action to maintain or
enforce international peace and security. Id. arts. 24, 25. U.N. Charter Article 51 also allows
for the use of force for self-defense. Id. art. 51.
199. Cover, supra note 195, at 1601. R
200. In practice, nation-states also use violence to enforce their interpretation of the law in the
international realm. For example, the United States has used violent means at the Mexico
border, potentially undermining the right to seek asylum. See, e.g., Megan Specia & Rick
Gladstone, Border Agents Shot Tear Gas into Mexico: Was It Legal?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28,
2018), https://perma.cc/E8E6-E3WG.
201. For a description of the range of non-state actors and their international legal personality see
SHAW, supra note 159, at 201–46; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 124–50 (2d R
ed. 2005).
202. Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the
Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2005).
203. Michele Olivier, Exploring Approaches to Accommodating Non-State Actors within Traditional
International Law, 4 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 15, 15 (2010).
204. Non State Actors 2016, supra note 155, at 611. R
205. See Non State Actors, 75 INT’L L. ASS’N REPS. CONFS. 658, 662–65 (2012) [hereinafter Non
State Actors 2012]
206. D’Aspremont, supra note 168, at 1128. D’Aspremont thus claims that the pluralization of R
international law is undisputed. Id. at 1120–23.
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processes for over two hundred years,207 the twentieth century was marked by an
increased intensity of non-state actor participation in international lawmak-
ing.208 Many scholars attribute the field’s increasing openness to non-state ac-
tors to globalization’s effect of decentralizing the importance of nation-states.209
Koh claims that the declining importance of sovereignty allows non-state actors
to conduct global decision-making.210 Thus legal “normative authority” can no
longer be considered the sole purview of the nation-state, but rather “a tangle of
complex procedures involving various state and non-state actors.”211
Within the discourse emphasizing non-state actor jurisgenesis, scholars
have highlighted that individuals can have international legal personality. The
recognition of individual criminal responsibility in international law, prompting
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and the formation of the International
Criminal Court, catalyzed “the process of internationalising the role of the in-
dividual.”212 The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights allows individuals to allege violations by state parties.213 The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination allows
individuals to lodge complaints for treaty violations.214
Individuals may also have obligations under international law. The estab-
lishment of individual criminal responsibility in particular has changed the con-
ception of non-state actor responsibility. The Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide declares that “[p]ersons committing
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals.”215 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Commit-
207. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18
MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 184–85 (1997) (describing the involvement of non-governmental
organizations within the international community).
208. See ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44
(Malcolm Evans & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2007) (noting the “exponential growth” of non-
state actor activity in the international arena).
209. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 170, at 490 (“[T]he idea of law and globalization provides a R
useful lens for viewing the way legal norms are constructed and disseminated in an era when
the prerogatives of territorially delimited nation-states, while not unimportant, have at the
very least become less salient than they once were.”).
210. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 15, at 2631. R
211. D’Aspremont, supra note 168, at 1124. R
212. Olivier, supra note 203, at 19. R
213. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302.
214. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art.
14(1), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
215. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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ted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia has jurisdiction over natural
persons and individuals responsible for crimes defined by the statute.216 The
Statute of the International Criminal Court also establishes jurisdiction over
natural persons.217 The subjecthood of individuals under international law in-
cludes not only rights, capacities, and duties, but also the ability to participate
in the formation of international law.218
Non-state participation in norm creation may be particularly effective in
the realm of soft law.219 For example, non-state actors play an important role in
shaping how states vote in U.N. General Assembly resolutions, and whether a
resolution will be submitted at all.220 The Global Compact, a critical piece of
migration soft law, was developed in response to the crisis of non-state actors’
death.
Non-state participation in norm creation plays a crucial role in adapting
international law to demands that extend beyond territorial confines. An inclu-
sive vision of international law as including non-state actors, for example,
helped energize Global South claims for a New International Economic Or-
der.221 Non-state actor participation has also proved crucial when norm creation
runs counter to the nation-state’s interest, as was the case with the development
of the right to self-determination.222 In the climate change context, wherein
international law has not yet grown to fully prevent transnational harm, non-
state actors’ jurisgenerative capacity presents a chance to promulgate more ef-
fective law.223
216. S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993).
217. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
218. See Robert McCorquodale, An Inclusive International Legal System, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
477, 485–92 (2004) (destabilizing the distinction between the subjects and objects of inter-
national law, and arguing for an inclusive international legal system that recognizes the ex-
panding role of non-state actors throughout the twenty-first century).
219. The International Law Association argues that non-state actors contribute to both hard and
soft law. Non State Actors 2012, supra note 205, at 691. R
220. Olivier, supra note 203, at 25. R
221. See McCorquodale, supra note 218, at 482. See QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE R
END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM (2018) for an account of the New
International Economic Order as part of the backdrop against the rise of neoliberal
globalism.
222. See id. at 492 (positioning the right to self-determination as counter to the interest of power-
ful colonial states).
223. The major mechanism to manage the transnational impact of greenhouse gas emissions, the
UNFCCC, has failed to achieve its stated objective, that is, to limit global warming. Al-
though 185 states agreed to limit average temperature increase to 2°C above preindustrial
levels in the Paris Agreement, current commitments under the agreement are set to lead to
approximately 3°C of warming. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1.; Ad-
dressing Global Warming, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, https://perma.cc/KE3M-VUXN.
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Given globalization’s transformation of sovereignty alongside the lack of
violent enforcement in international law, non-state actors are positioned to
generate international legal norms that respond to the reality of transnational
impacts in a globalized world.224 Yet the reconstruction of sovereignty serves
not only as a condition for, but also a possible outcome of non-state actor juris-
genesis. Next, I claim that as the centrality of the nation-state erodes, non-state
actors have the power to participate in re-constituting sovereignty through
admission.
IV. RE-CONSTITUTING SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH ADMISSION
To this point, I have argued that international law creates a protection gap
vis-à-vis climate-induced migration because contemporary sovereignty is con-
stituted through exclusion. I have also made the theoretical claim that non-state
actors have the power to change international law. This Part proposes that non-
state actors—the Global South diaspora in particular—should use their juris-
generative capacity to create legal norms that re-constitute sovereignty through
admission. To support this claim, this Part uses FMAs to demonstrate that
nation-states can preserve sovereignty while abrogating their right to exclude. It
also highlights the benefits of using FMAs to address the climate-induced mi-
gration protection gap. Finally, this Part names the Global South diaspora as a
particularly powerful norm creator on trans-regional migration.
A. Liberalizing Borders Through Free Movement Agreements
Although the contemporary constitution of sovereignty hinges on exclu-
sion of foreigners, many nation-states demonstrate that preserving sovereignty
and liberalizing admission can occur contemporaneously by participating in
FMAs. FMAs are provisions within (sub-)regional economic integration
schemes that liberalize migration restrictions between participating member
states.225 These agreements arose within the context of increased international
Climate scientists predict that this level of warming will result in catastrophic effects on
human life, especially the global poor, and ecosystems. See IPCC, 1.5°C REPORT, supra note
22. R
224. For a theory of the weakening of state sovereignty, see Seyla Benhabib, Twilight of Sover-
eignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times, in
DEMOCRACY, STATES, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 79, 89 (Heather
Gautney et al. eds., 2009) (“[A]n epochal change is under way in which aspects of state
sovereignty are being dismantled chip by chip.”).
225. FMAs play an expanding role in the growing body of international migration law. Chetail
refers to these as free movement regimes, but I use the term free movement agreement to
point to their legally binding nature. Chetail, supra note 17, at 33. Ferris calls FMAs Free R
Movement Protocols. Ferris, supra note 53, at 23. McMahon calls FMAs regional migration R
regimes. MCMAHON, supra note 114, at 78. R
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economic integration.226 The explosion of regional free trade agreements that
attended the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995, along
with earlier efforts at regional integration following World War II, led to in-
creased facilitation of both the movement of goods and people.227 The trend
toward regional free movement points to the notion that nation-states can
maintain their sovereignty while agreeing to liberalize borders.
FMAs range from agreements that remove visa requirements for entry into
member states to agreements that provide more comprehensive rights to reside
and work.228 The agreements may be applied unevenly, with rights and benefits
extended to pre-defined categories of people, including migrant workers, busi-
ness people, students, and refugees.229 In most regions, FMAs are linked to a
common market, where free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor
serve as the basis of economic integration, and workers are granted the right to
enter, work, and/or settle in member states.230
226. International Political Economy scholars have framed the expansion of economic integration
measures in terms of two waves of regionalism. In regionalism’s first iteration, cooperative
agreements between neighboring states focused on economic integration. Second-generation
regionalism integrates social, political and cultural cooperation into economic integration
aims. For example, in second wave agreements, mobility rights may extend to both those
who can contribute to the labor market, and those who cannot. Others have proposed a third
generation of regionalism, wherein regional organizations act collectively in global politics.
While this remains a normative idea at present, it may become more common. See MIGRA-
TION, FREE MOVEMENT AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION xvi–xviii (Phillipe de Lombaerde
et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter UNESCO FMA Essays]. For a discussion of regionalism and
regional trade agreements, see Chad Damro, The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agree-
ments, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 23, 26–29
(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006).
227. FMAs run counter to the traditional view that increased free trade has occurred without
increased mobility. The assertion that free trade happened without liberalized migration
stems from the scholarly focus on South-North migratory flows. See, e.g., Gustavo A. Flores-
Macı́as, Migration and Free Trade Agreements: Lessons from NAFTA and Perspectives for
CAFTA-DR, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 147, 147–48 (Ryszard Cholewinski et
al. eds., 2007) (discussing the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) to claim
that although NAFTA aimed to stem unauthorized migration from Mexico by reducing
economic inequality between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, it increased migratory
flows without increasing regular migration pathways).
228. UNESCO FMA Essays, supra note 226, at xv. R
229. Id. at xx.
230. Sonja Nita, Free Movement of People within Regional Integration Processes: A Comparative
View, in UNESCO FMA Essays, supra note 226 at 3, 7. The EU, ECOWAS, R
MERCOSUR, and CARICOM all adhere to this rubric of free movement within a com-
mon market. Id. at xxi–xxiii. See also PETER ROBSON, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INTEGRATION 2 (1980) (defining a common market as a form of regional
integration in which there is not only a common external tariff and tariff-free movement of
goods and services, but also freedom of movement for factors of production—labor, capital,
and enterprise).
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While the European Union (“EU”) receives the most scholarly attention,
FMAs exist across all continents, with approximately 120 nation-states partici-
pating in regional arrangements that include free movement provisions.231 Afri-
can countries participate in the largest number of FMAs as members of the
Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”), the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East Africa Community, the
Southern Africa Development Community (“SADC”), and the Economic
Community of Central African States.232 Asia-Pacific FMAs are embedded
within the Association of South East Asian Nations and the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Common Mar-
ket of the South (“MERCOSUR”) and the Caribbean Community
(“CARICOM”) also contain FMAs.233
The array of rights FMAs offer to citizens of participating nation-states
varies. Most agreements grant as-of-right temporary visa extensions, while
others provide for visa-free travel.234 In most cases, FMAs provide that entry of
a foreign national can be barred if admission would contravene public policy,
public security, or public health.235 Beyond the right to temporary admission,
some FMAs also provide pathways to residence, with most agreements condi-
tioning residence rights on employment.236 Granting residence to foreign na-
tionals in the work force accords with the aim of most FMAs, that is, to
facilitate the movement of labor.
231. See Chetail, supra note 17, at 33–35. R
232. Id. at 33–34. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (“IGAD”) is currently de-
veloping a protocol on the free movement of persons to implement article 7(b) of the agree-
ment establishing IGAD to “promote free movement of goods, services, and people and the
establishment of residence.” Nita, supra note 230, at 9. IGAD recently entered the final R
phases of negotiations on its Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. IGAD Member States to
Refine the Draft Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, IGAD (Oct. 14, 2019), https://
perma.cc/5B65-ZSLX.
233. The Andean Pact (“CAN”) contains another FMA in the region. However, implementation
has been uneven. Mercedes Eguiguren, Regional Migratory Policies Within the Andean Com-
munity of Nations: Crisis vs. Reinforcement of Freedom of Movement Within the Region, in
UNESCO FMA Essays, supra note 226, at 237, 245. NAFTA might have been a prominent R
FMA within the Western Hemisphere. Yet the 1993 NAFTA text contains only one migra-
tion provision, related to the temporary entry of business persons. Flores-Macı́as, supra note
227, at 147. The United States–Mexico-Canada Agreement, which will replace NAFTA R
when it comes into force, maintains a chapter on the temporary admission of business per-
sons. United States–Mexico-Canada Agreement ch.16, opened for signature Sept. 20, 2018.
234. Nita, supra note 230, at 15. The EU is an outlier in stipulating visa-free travel—most agree- R
ments grant only temporary visa exemption. Within the EU and Schengen Area, for exam-
ple, visa-free travel allows every citizen of member states to the Schengen acquis entry into
other member states without a visa. Id. at 11.
235. Id. at 11.
236. Id. at 25.
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FMAs typically address labor directly, either offering mobility or granting
access to labor markets for certain categories of workers, often highly skilled
ones.237 Some FMAs follow the General Agreement on Trade in Services
model by granting labor market access to only service providers on a temporary
basis, while others aim to protect the rights of migrant workers.238
Indeed, some FMAs have evolved beyond the original conception of liber-
alizing movement of labor, and have transitioned toward creating regional citi-
zenship. For example, MERCOSUR—originally a common market established
by the Treaty of Asunción between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Para-
guay—has expanded to include other countries and now aims to “promote
channels for social participation as a key way of strengthening regional integra-
tion.”239 Mutual recognition of skills and qualifications is one aspect of FMAs
that coheres to both the economic and social aims of these agreements,240
alongside social, health, and labor regulations.241
Within international trade law, FMAs’ first legal home, regionalism, has
“sometimes been interpreted as a new way of governing competition among
states with respect to the regulation of all issues related with international
trade,”242 a challenge to the multilateral regime,243 an expression of neoliberal-
ism,244 or an abrogation of sovereignty.245 However, most nation-states opt to
structure FMAs as intergovernmental agreements, rather than establish a su-
237. For example, article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU grants nationals of EU
Member States the right to work in any other Member State without a work permit. Con-
solidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 45, 2008
O.J. C 115/47, Sept. 5, 2008. This right includes equality of treatment, remuneration, and
working conditions compared to nationals of the host State. Id.
238. Nita, supra note 230, at 18. R
239. Carla Gallinati & Natalia Gavazzo, ‘We Are All MERCOSUR’: Discourses and Practices About
Free Movement in the Current Regional Integration of South-America, in UNESCO FMA
Essays, supra note 226, at 201–02. For a discussion of MERCOSUR’s potential as a protec- R
tive framework for climate migrants, see PDD, supra note 167, at 142. R
240. See Nita, supra note 230, at 29–35 for an overview of mutual recognition of skills and qualifi- R
cations in FMAs.
241. UNESCO FMA Essays, supra note 226, at xxv. R
242. Phillippe de Lombaerde & Liliana Lizarazo Rodriguez, International Regionalism and Na-
tional Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment, 24 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 23, 28 (2014).
243. See Alberta Fabbricotti, Multilateralizing Regionalism and the Future Architecture of Interna-
tional Trade Law, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 119, 128 (2009); see also Melissa Robbins,
Powerful States, Customary Law and the Erosion of Human Rights through Regional Enforce-
ment, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 275 (2005) (claiming that regionalization in international
human rights law results in the dilution of human rights).
244. See David Grewal, Globalism and the Dialectic of Globalization, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT
(Apr. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZE3D-SQAT.
245. See M.I. Anushiem & Kingsley C. Ehujuo, Implementation of Treaty as Basis for Regional
Cooperation Vis-à-vis Absolute Sovereignty: Nigeria in Perspective, 8 NNAMDI AZIKIWE U. J.
INT’L L. & JURIS. 161 (2017).
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pranational structure of governance, because of a reluctance to abdicate sover-
eignty.246 Thus, FMAs demonstrate that nation-states can maintain sovereignty
even while agreeing to limit the exercise of their right to exclude in the context
of regional agreements.
Separating sovereignty from exclusion is useful because of the demands of
climate change, as well as the scale of contemporary mobility.247 Yet scant at-
tention has been paid to FMAs as a climate-induced migration solution, with
limited exceptions. PDD identifies FMAs as one framework through which
nation-state humanitarian protection measures can operate.248 Ferris proposes
FMAs as a protection framework in passing.249 Wood reports on free move-
ment within Africa, but as Wood herself notes, no academic literature has yet
been produced on FMAs’ potential to address climate-induced migration
concerns.250
Although scholars have overlooked FMAs, these agreements serve as a
useful protection framework for three reasons: i) FMAs respond to the complex
and regional nature of climate-induced migration; ii) the expansion of FMAs to
account for climate-induced migration is politically feasible; and iii) FMAs
build structural and individual resilience.251
246. See MIGRATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION xxiv (Phillipe de
Lombaerde et al. eds., 2017); de Lombaerde & Lizarazo Rodriguez, supra note 242, at 27
(framing intergovernmental agreements as more horizontal structures than supranational
institutions).
247. See Katrina M. Wyman, Limiting the National Right to Exclude, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425,
429–32 (2018) (arguing that climate change may justify limiting the right to exclude).
248. PDD, supra note 167, at 135. PDD mentions that the SADC, ECOWAS, or the EU could R
provide the basis for new norms on migration and displacement. Id. at 137. For further
discussion of PDD, see supra Part I.B.
249. Ferris, supra note 53, at 24 (“[T]here are uneven but promising efforts to develop regional R
protocols for free movement of people, which might well be the most productive means to
address future cross-border movements resulting from the effects of climate change.”). Ra-
mos and Cavedon-Capdeville also discuss free movement within the Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR) while generally advocating for regional responses to climate-in-
duced migration. See Erika Pires Ramos & Fernanda de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville, Regional
Responses to Climate Change and Migration in Latin America, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 262, 274–75 (Benoı̂t Mayer & François
Crépeau eds., 2017).
250. TAMARA WOOD, THE ROLE OF FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AGREEMENTS IN AD-
DRESSING DISASTER DISPLACEMENT 12–13 (2019), https://perma.cc/3QZG-ZJPU.
251. In presenting FMAs as a solution for climate-induced migration, this Article does not mini-
mize the importance of mitigation. However, climate change impacts already exacerbate mi-
gration and displacement, making legal frameworks that account for the cross-border
climate-induced migration gap relevant whether or not the global community limits the
increase of average global temperature to below 2°C as agreed in Paris, and 1.5°C as neces-
sary for the survival of SIDS.
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First, FMAs provide a flexible mobility management structure.252 The
agreements allow for movement before, during, or after a sudden- or slow-onset
event, thereby increasing mobility options regardless of whether movement was
forced or voluntary, is temporary or permanent, or was directly caused by a
climate-related event.253 FMAs respond not to the root cause of migration but
to its effects.254 In so doing, FMAs eradicate the causality barrier migrants face
when seeking protection under international refugee law or would face under a
multilateral convention modeled on the 1951 Refugee Convention, that is, hav-
ing to prove they were displaced by a climate-related event.255 Moreover, in
increasing mobility pathways for all eligible migrants, FMAs avoid the issue of
privileging climate migrants in particular.256
In addition to accommodating the temporal and causal complexity of cli-
mate-induced migration, FMAs also respond to the regional nature of migra-
tion. Regional movement is especially common between countries that share a
252. The complex nature of climate-induced migration has frustrated attempts to theorize appro-
priate responses. See Jakobsson, supra note 93, at 62. R
253. In the case of forced displacement, other measures that address the difficulty forced migrants
experience in resettlement might be more appropriate. See Graeme Hugo, Climate
Change–Induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia and the Pacific, in CLI-
MATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT, supra note 35, at 9–10. R
254. As noted in Part I, sudden-onset disasters tend to result in short-term internal displace-
ments, while slow-onset events tend to result in more permanent migration over longer
distances, including across borders. However, in the case of small countries, especially those
where disaster overwhelms capacity, sudden-onset disasters can result in cross-border migra-
tion. The literature further complicates the story. Reuveny and Moore, Drabo and Mbaye,
and Naudé all find a positive relationship between natural disasters and international migra-
tion. See Rafael Reuveny & Will H. Moore, Does Environmental Degradation Influence Mi-
gration? Emigration to Developed Countries in the Late 1980s and 1990s, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 461
(2009); ALASSANE DRABO & LINGUÈRE M. MBAYE, CLIMATE CHANGE, NATURAL DI-
SASTERS & MIGRATION (2011); WIM NAUDÉ, CONFLICT, DISASTERS AND NO JOBS:
REASONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2008). In regions
with “porous borders,” like Africa, crossing an international border may be more feasible
than internal migration over long distances. See Michel Beine & Christopher Parsons, Cli-
mate Factors as Determinants of International Migration 14 (Institut de Recherches Économi-
ques et Sociales de l’Université Catholique de Louvain, Discussion Paper No. 2012-2, 2012).
Furthermore, sudden- and slow-onset events can feed into each other, causing temporary
displacement to become more permanent. See DAVID CANTOR, CROSS-BORDER DISPLACE-
MENT, CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTERS 14 (2018). FMAs can be responsive to migrant
needs in the absence of sharply delineated causal factors.
255. See WOOD, supra note 250, at 27 (“[T]his is a significant advantage given the multi-causal R
nature of disaster displacement and the well-recognized difficulties associated with identify-
ing ‘disaster displaced persons.’ ”). For a discussion on climate-induced migration and causal-
ity, see supra Part I.A.
256. See Benoı̂t Mayer, Critical Perspective on the Identification of ‘Environmental Refugees’ as a
Category of Human Rights Concern, in CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 53, at 28, 35–37 (discussing the ethical implications of the normative R
discourse on “environmental refugees”).
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common border, making shorter distances more characteristic of migration in
the Global South, where the majority of migration occurs.257 FMAs can capture
this short-range cross-border movement.258 Because climate impacts vary across
regions, regional responses to migration may also be more appropriate.259
From a theoretical perspective, FMAs cohere with scholarly calls for re-
gional approaches to migration management.260 Migration scholars note that
managing migration at the regional level provides important advantages. Na-
tion-states are more likely to abrogate their authority at the regional rather than
international level, and are also more open to negotiations with similarly-situ-
ated nation-states.261 Furthermore, regional agreements can result in a more
balanced distribution of benefits than bilateral agreements, which tend to favor
the receiving country.262
Second, FMAs are more politically feasible than a global multilateral
agreement on climate-induced migration and nimble enough to adapt to the
particular needs of climate migrants. Neighboring nation-states share similar
concerns and thus can reach consensus more quickly than in a global multilat-
257. See Beine & Parsons, supra note 254, at 11, 19. As is true of global migration generally, most R
cross-border climate-induced migration is regional, including in Europe, Africa, Asia, and
Southern and Central America. But see Diego Acosta, Global Migration Law and Regional
Free Movement: Compliance and Adjudication - the Case of South America, 111 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND 159, 159 n.4 (2017) (noting that North America (Canada and USA) and
Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) are exceptions).
258. Most climate migrants would prefer to stay in place, with evidence showing that the majority
of migrants return home when possible. See Graeme Hugo, Future Demographic Change and
Its Interactions with Migration and Climate Change, 21S GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE, S21–33
(2011); Karen E. McNamara & Chris Gibson, ‘We Do Not Want to Leave our Land’: Pacific
Ambassadors at the United Nations Resist the Category of ‘Climate Refugees,’ 40 GEOFORUM
475 (2009). The fact that FMAs facilitate movement intra-regionally may also allow mi-
grants to relocate to countries that share similar cultures and values. This might improve the
resettlement experience when cross-border migration is the only viable option.
259. See PDD, supra note 167, at 137 (noting that disaster displacement experiences tend to be R
similar by region). The Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action serves as one example of a
regional response. See Regional Refugee Instruments & Related, Brazil Declaration: A
Framework for Cooperation and Regional Solidarity to Strengthen the International Protec-
tion of Refugees, Displaced and Stateless Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean at
3–4, Dec. 3, 2014, 989 U.N.T.S. 175.
260. See MCMAHON, supra note 114, at 10 (arguing for a supranational approach at the regional R
level as “the most sustainable long-term step towards legitimate migration control”); Benoı̂t
Mayer, Environmental Migration: Prospects for a Regional Governance in the Asia-Pacific, 16
ASIA-PAC. J. ENV’T L. 77, 91–103 (2013) (arguing that regional responses may be more
effective than other proposals like a new global multilateral convention).
261. See Mayer, supra note 260, at 92–93. R
262. See UNESCO FMA Essays, supra note 226, at xv. But see Bimal Ghosh, Managing Migra- R
tion: Towards the Missing Regime?, in MIGRATION WITHOUT BORDERS, ESSAYS ON THE
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 113–14 (Paul De Guchteneire & Antoine Pècoud eds.,
2007) (noting that sending and receiving countries may not always be in the same region).
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eral process.263 Additionally, regional agreements are easier to achieve because
fewer states are involved than at a global multilateral level, and regions may
demonstrate greater levels of mutual trust.264 For these reasons, “[d]iscussions at
the regional level” can “bring the issue of protection of disaster-displaced per-
sons back to the affected population at the regional, national, and even local
levels, rather than leaving it within the international impasse.”265 McMahon
argues that a regional, supranational approach would be the most sustainable
pathway towards legitimate migration management because it is more likely to
eschew political weaknesses.266
Because of the comparative ease of negotiating regional versus multilateral
agreements, FMAs can be more readily adapted to the demands of climate-
induced migration. Given that few FMAs currently guarantee regional citizen-
ship, these frameworks would need to be redesigned to fully be protective.267
Granting migrants access to territory without access to residence, citizenship, or
social benefits can render migrants second-rate members of their host societies.
The Compact of Free Association with Palau, Federated States of Micronesia,
and Marshall Islands, for example, allows visa-free entry into the United States
but does not authorize citizenship or access to all federal benefits, at times hin-
dering access to health care.268 FMAs would need to guarantee access to eco-
nomic, social, and political rights to circumvent discrimination against foreign
nationals.269 Such redesign remains more easily achieved at the regional versus
multilateral level.
Third, FMAs increase economic resilience at both the structural and indi-
vidual level, reducing the need for migration as a response to slow- and sudden-
onset disasters. Economic factors play a larger role in determining migration
outcomes than environmental drivers.270 In attending to this fact, scholars have
highlighted that legal solutions that target climate migrants should include eco-
nomic migrants.271 Although the way economic and environmental drivers in-
teract have stymied attempts to create solutions that target climate migrants,
scholars have largely missed the silver lining. As Barnett and Webber put it,
“[r]educing the likelihood of migration arising from climate change is . . .
263. See PDD, supra note 167, at 137 (arguing for a regional approach to enhancing protection R
for disaster displaced persons).
264. See UNESCO FMA Essays, supra note 226, at xiv. R
265. PDD, supra note 167, at 137. R
266. MCMAHON, supra note 114, at 203. R
267. FMAs would also need to protect against forcible return. Many FMAs prohibit mass expul-
sion, cautioning that individual cases for deportation be considered on their own merits.
WOOD, supra note 250, at 38. However, provisions that limit state discretion to suspend R
FMAs or the rights of migrants would add further protection.
268. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNT. OFF., COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION 11 (2020).
269. UNESCO FMA Essays, supra note 226, at xxiv. R
270. BARNETT & WEBBER, supra note 46, at 6. R
271. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 256, at 35–37. R
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something that in theory is largely within the control of the people.”272 By en-
hancing economic resilience, FMAs can also allow migrants to stay in place in
the long term.
Economists have touted the benefits of liberalizing the movement of labor,
and its attendant benefits on global income gaps.273 Development economist
Michael Clemens argues that reducing migration barriers would lead to greater
global gains than the gains that arise from the reduction of barriers to capital
and trade.274 Rodrik also supports this position, arguing that micro-expansions
of labor mobility would generate economic gains for migrant workers and their
home countries.275 Although these economists have focused on South-North
migratory flows, research on international economic integration indicates that
FMAs do have important economic benefits intra-regionally.276
Indeed, migration can serve as a development strategy. African states sup-
ported the Global Compact, emphasizing the need to mainstream “migration
into development strategies that include gainful employment, remittances and
financial inclusion and the circulation of professionals of all skill levels, and
arrangements for free movement.”277 CARICOM frames its FMA as a matter
of development policy.278 In this vein, CARICOM aims to expand the catego-
ries of professionals covered under the FMA to include agricultural, security
272. BARNETT & WEBBER, supra note 46, at 6. R
273. While expanding labor mobility, the rights of migrant workers must be protected. See Nita,
supra note 230, at 23. New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (“RSE”) and Austra- R
lia’s Seasonal Worker Program, for example, generally protect migrant workers’ rights, mak-
ing these schemes more effective for migrants and their families. See generally Richard
Bedford et al., Managed Temporary Labour Migration of Pacific Islanders to Australia and New
Zealand in the Early Twenty-first Century, 48 AUSTL. GEOGRAPHER 37 (2017).
274. Michael A. Clemens, Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?, 25 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 83, 84–86 (2011).
275. Dani Rodrik, Labor Markets: The Unexploited Frontier of Globalization, GLOBALIST (May 31,
2011), https://perma.cc/4T3R-HFEF. See also Howard F. Chang, The Economics of Interna-
tional Labor Migration and the Case for Global Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory,
41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (2008) (adding a distributive justice argument to the economic
finding that liberalizing movement of labor would result in global economic welfare gains).
276. See generally ROBSON, supra note 230 (outlining gains from increased specialization among R
countries with different economic characters, capital accumulation and growth, economic
stability among other benefits).
277. AFRICAN UNION, DRAFT COMMON AFRICAN POSITION ON THE GLOBAL COMPACT FOR
SAFE, ORDERLY AND REGULAR MIGRATION 5 (2017). For a discussion of regionalism’s
development benefits through trade expansion in Africa, see Olasupo Owoeye, Regionalism
and WTO Multilateralism: The Case for an African Continental Free Trade Area, 50 J. WORLD
TRADE 1085 (2016).
278. See Officials Look at Free Movement of Skills, Facilitation of Travel for CARICOM Nationals,
ST. LUCIA NEWS ONLINE (Oct. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/Y67G-TYTN (quoting Barba-
dos Ambassador to CARICOM as saying “[t]his is the heart and core of CARICOM.
CARICOM is about facilitating business people, [and] workers, to move across the region
to pursue career opportunities, to pursue business opportunities, and by so doing, to raise
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and domestic workers.279 In the Pacific, Australia’s Seasonal Worker Program
originally aimed to promote economic development in the Pacific Islands, but is
now used to facilitate adaptation.280 FMAs capture these migration-develop-
ment co-benefits.
Furthermore, FMAs can increase economic resilience at a community and
individual level. Circular, temporary, and permanent migratory flows facilitated
by FMAs can expand livelihood options.281 The majority of migrants of work-
ing age participate in the labor market,282 earning income that can flow back to
communities in countries of origin. Remittances, money transfers from mi-
grants to their home countries, play a key role in increasing community resili-
ence in countries of origin,283 with payments supporting investments in
housing, health, education, and daily subsistence needs.284 A U.N. University
study in the Pacific found that remittances can help households adapt to cli-
mate change impacts.285
FMAs hold the potential to serve as a critical tool in addressing climate-
induced migration. The liberalized mobility they allow, however, grates against
international law’s general affirmation of the right to exclude.286 Although
productivity within the region; to raise employment levels and to raise investment levels
within the region.”).
279. See CARICOM Labour Ministers to Meet Wednesday to Discuss Free Movement for Security
Guards and Agricultural Workers, ST. LUCIA NEWS ONLINE (Feb. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/
CDW4-S5AA.
280. See Bedford et al., supra note 273, at 40. R
281. See Can Free-Movement Agreements Help People Displaced by Climate Change & Disaster,
KANDOR CTR. FOR INT’L REFUGEE L. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/E93T-T6XK.
282. See Leighton & Byrne, supra note 33. R
283. See BARNETT & WEBBER, supra note 46, at 22. R
284. See Nicholas Van Hear, “I Went as Far as My Money Would Take Me”: Conflict, Forced Migra-
tion and Class, in FORCED MIGRATION AND GLOBAL PROCESSES 125, 137 (François Cré-
peau & Delphine Nakache eds., 2006); see also RICHARD CURTAIN ET AL., PACIFIC
POSSIBLE: LABOUR MOBILITY 7–8 (July 2016) (arguing that remittances correlate with de-
velopment indicators and opportunities for migration incentivize human capital development
in countries of origin).
285. Compare OAKES ET AL., supra note 49, at 1 (finding that remittances are not significant R
enough to support Kiribati households in adapting to climate impacts), with Issah Justice
Musah-Surugu et al., Migrants’ Remittances: A Complementary Source of Financing Adaptation
to Climate Change at the Local Level in Ghana, 10 INT’L J. CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES
& MGMT. 178, 191–92 (2017) (arguing that remittances are a complementary source of
adaptation finance).
286. Migration discourse creates the impression that all people cannot move freely. But race and
class influence access to mobility. See Munshi, supra note 115, at 247 (“The notion that R
different peoples are naturally endowed with different capacities for free movement . . . finds
expression in U.S. immigration law and policy, which has long encouraged the free move-
ment of certain peoples, especially white Europeans, while frustrating the movement of
racialized others, particularly through policies of exclusion.”); see also Steffen Mau, Mobility
Citizenship, Inequality, and the Liberal State: The Case of Visa Policies, 4 INT’L POL. SOCIO.
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FMAs serve as a useful mechanism for facilitating migration, driven by climate
change and other factors, their operation solely within the Global South also
limits their distributive potential. FMAs that included both rich and poor
countries would allow for migration to serve as a re-distributive strategy. This
would be particularly appropriate in the climate context where excessive extrac-
tion in the Global North has resulted, in part, in Global Southerners fleeing
their homes.
Admittedly, the normative proposal of liberalizing borders in the context
of regional agreements must contend with the reality of geopolitical power im-
balances. Intra-regional economic disparity can hinder attempts at securing
FMA.287 SADC’s goal of full free movement by 2005 was scaled back, for ex-
ample, due to concerns that economic disparity within the region would lead to
mass migration to South Africa.288 Inter-regional economic disparities could
also undermine attempts to broaden the scope of FMAs. Furthermore, formerly
colonized nation-states have expressed difficulty in shaping international law.
Attapattu argues that the conflict between rich and poor nations, or the
North-South divide, undermines the effectiveness of international law.289 In the
climate arena, friction between the developing countries negotiating bloc, the
Group of 77, and other UNFCCC Parties over climate finance point to the
challenges formerly colonized States face in multilateral processes.290 Outside of
the environmental context, Third World Approaches to International Law
(“TWAIL”) scholars have outlined a colonial legacy that has endured.
If formerly colonized nation-states must achieve both political and eco-
nomic equality to be able to meaningfully participate in multilateral juris-
genesis, then people of the Global South may also need political and economic
gains to become jurisgenerative agents.291 Yet the positionality of the Global
339, 349 (2010) (concluding that “the freedom of movement people enjoy depends greatly
on their being citizens of rich democracies” after analyzing the visa regimes of 193
countries).
287. See UNESCO FMA Essays, supra note 226, at xxiii. R
288. See John O. Oucho & J. Crush, Contra Free Movement: South Africa and the SADC Migration
Protocols, 48 AFR. TODAY 139, 146 (2001); Jonathan Martens, Moving Freely on the African
Continent: The Experiences of ECOWAS and SADC with Free Movement Protocols, in INTER-
NATIONAL MIGRATION LAW, supra note 227, at 358. R
289. Sumudu Atapattu & Carmen G. Gonzalez, The North-South Divide in International Envi-
ronmental Law: Framing the Issues, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
GLOBAL SOUTH 1, 1–2 (Shawkat Alam et al. eds., 2015).
290. Maxine Burkett calls this a justice paradox. Maxine Burkett, A Justice Paradox: On Climate
Change, Small Island Developing States, and the Quest for Effective Legal Remedy, 35 U. HAW.
L. REV. 633 (2013).
291. Critical legal scholars have undone the notion that lawmaking does not require power. See
Mark V. Tushnet, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239 (1984)
(explaining the traditional view that the rule of law is meant to guarantee that individuals
cannot co-opt the coercive power of institutions, primarily the nation-state).
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diaspora becomes important here. Global Southerners located within the
Global North could amplify their power by recognizing themselves as a
collective.
While a major goal of this Article is to make the theoretical claim that
migrants can make international law, a second goal of this Article is to shift the
frame to focus on the Global South. I turn more fully to this aim in the final
section. In particular, I name the Global South diaspora as a powerful non-state
actor that can help reformulate conceptions of sovereignty.
B. The Global South Diaspora as Jurisgenerative Agent
Although FMAs may have some beneficial outcomes for communities dis-
placed by the effects of climate change, there is also room for Global
Southerners located within the Global North to create broader international
legal norms surrounding trans-regional migration. While the Global South di-
aspora can leverage their jurisgenerative power to advocate for more liberalized
borders through FMAs, the Global South diaspora can also engage in norm
creation to undo the constitutive relationship between sovereignty and exclu-
sion. Naming the Global South diaspora as a jurisgenerative agent makes it
possible to locate their power to bring a much-needed hybrid perspective to
transnational dilemmas.
In the realm of the international law of migration, the Global South dias-
pora is particularly well suited for legal norm creation because of its transna-
tional character and the territorially unbounded nature of activity in which the
diaspora already engages. The Global South diaspora also embodies a hybridity
that contains the potential for reconceptualizing North-South relations, a
reconceptualization that remains critically important for climate-induced mi-
gration, where the plundering of the global commons by the North contributes
to the destabilization of residents from the South.
My naming of Global Southerners residing in the Global North as a dias-
pora builds on the conceptualization of the Global South as a political economy
category beyond the confines of geography.292 The term Global South first
emerged in the 1970s as part of efforts to categorize a set of economically dis-
advantaged nation-states and replace the term “Third World.”293 Since then,
scholars have shifted the concept of the Global South beyond the confines of
the nation-state to designate people and spaces joined by negative experiences
under contemporary global capitalism.294 In this rendering, the Global South
292. Cf. ANNE G. MAHLER, FROM THE TRICONTINENTAL TO THE GLOBAL SOUTH 33 (2018)
(describing the Global South as “an emergent political imagination undergirding contempo-
rary social movements”).
293. Arif Dirlik, Global South: Predicament and Promise, 1 GLOB. S. 12, 12–13 (2007).
294. See GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOUTH 3 (Caroline Thomas & Peter Wilkin eds., 1997)
(calling scholars to “liberate our thinking from the constraints imposed by interpretation
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becomes “a geographically flexible, sociospatial mapping of the so-called exter-
nalities of capitalist accumulation.”295 This de-territorialized view of the Global
South makes it possible to locate “Souths in the geographic North and Norths
in the Geographic South.”296 A de-territorialized view of the Global South also
makes it possible to locate Southerners in the Global North and name them as
a collective.
Indeed, the Global South has evolved to articulate a contemporary theory
of transnational political resistance led by a subaltern collective so that the
Global South is now a “transnational political imaginary.”297 Prashad highlights
the political potential of this subaltern collective, defining the Global South as a
“concatenation of protests against the theft of the commons, against the theft of
human dignity and rights” so that “the global South is this: a world of protest, a
whirlwind of creative activity.”298 López claims that any understanding of the
contemporary Global South requires centralizing “a global subaltern that in-
creasingly recognizes itself as such.”299 Within this framing of the Global South
as a subaltern political imaginary, diasporic theory serves to emphasize the col-
lective power of the subaltern community residing in the Global North. I define
the Global South diaspora as people descended from the Global South residing
in the Global North.300
Dániel Gazsó defines diaspora generally as “geographically dispersed
macro communities of migratory origin,” who have “integrated into the society
surrounding them, but have not fully assimilated,” and have “symbolic or objec-
tive relationships with kin communities living in other areas, but believed to be
of identical origin, and with their real or imagined ancestral homeland or kin
within a territorially-based state-centric worldview, which concentrates on a North/South
gap in terms of states” (emphasis in original)); Eric Sheppard & Richa Nagar, From East-
West to North-South, 36 ANTIPODE 557, 558 (2004) (“[T]he global North is constituted
through a network of political and economic elites spanning privileged localities across the
globe.”).
295. MAHLER, supra note 292, at 33. R
296. Id. at 32.
297. Id. at 33.
298. VIJAY PRASHAD, THE POORER NATIONS 9 (2012).
299. Alfred J. López, Introduction: The (Post)global South, 1 GLOB. S. 1, 5 (2007).
300. More than 230 million people lived outside their country of origin at the beginning of this
century, most of whom relocated regionally. Although the majority of migrants in sub-
Saharan Africa (89%), Eastern and South-Eastern Asia (83%), Latin America and the Car-
ibbean (73%), and Central and Southern Asia (63%), moved within their region of residence,
most migrants living in North America (98%), Oceania (88%), and Northern Africa and
Western Asia (59%), were born outside their home region. See James Hollifield & Rahfin
Faruk, Governing Migration in an Age of Globalization, in MIGRATION ON THE MOVE 118,
119 (Carolus Grütters et al. eds., 2017); United Nations, The Number of International Mi-
grants Reaches 272 Million, Continuing an Upward Trend in All World Regions, Says U.N.,
(Sept. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/7SYD-3KTR.
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state.”301 Although the definition Gazsó and others provide ties each diaspora
to a particular homeland state,302 the term’s original connotation is much
broader. Diaspora originates from the Greek word for geographical “scattering”
or “dispersion.”303
Because of the territorially unmoored nature of diasporic communities
who maintain ties to real and imagined homelands while physically residing
abroad, the diaspora is “rooted in ideas rather than places.”304 As such, the dias-
pora is a powerful imaginative community. Addis claims that “imagining is an
important defining feature of all diasporas.”305 Yet, this imagining has not yet
been used to shape the law. Although “[d]iasporas are the exemplary communi-
ties of the transnational moment,” their jurisgenerative power has heretofore
been overlooked.
While diaspora has been extensively theorized by humanists and social
scientists, legal theorists have fallen behind in considering the legal and political
implications of diasporic communities. Chander, whose work introduced dias-
pora as a subject of legal inquiry, proposes diaspora as a way to theorize a mid-
dle ground between statist and cosmopolitan conceptions of the law.306 “The
dominant statist model of international law, which limits the read of a state’s
laws to its own geographic boundaries,” Chander writes, “allows no legal con-
nection between a diaspora and its homeland.”307 Cosmopolitan models of in-
ternational law advanced by scholars such as Brian Barry, Charles Beitz,
Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Pogge, and Jeremy Waldron also deny the validity
of diasporic legal ties to homeland.308 According to the cosmopolitan model,
allegiance should serve humankind, not any one nation’s flag.309
Chander offers a third paradigm—the diaspora model. The diaspora
model “finds in the hybridity and dual loyalty of diaspora the basis for recon-
ceiving the citizen as able to live and thrive with multiple and overlapping loy-
301. Dániel Gazsó, Diaspora Policies in Theory and Practice, 1 HUNG. J. MINORITY STUD. 65, 66
(2017); see also Yossi Shain & Aharon Barth, Diasporas and International Relations Theory, 57
INT’L ORG. 449, 452 (2001) (defining diaspora as “a people with common origin who reside,
more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious home-
land—whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control”).
302. See, e.g., Judith M. Brown, Global South Asians 4 (2006).
303. Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1015 (2001).
304. Pico Iyer, Living in the Transit Lounge, in UNROOTED CHILDHOODS 7, 11 (Faith Eidse &
Nina Sichel eds., 2004).
305. Adeno Addis, Imagining the Homeland from Afar: Community and Peoplehood in the Age of the
Diaspora, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 963, 985 (2012).
306. See Chander, supra note 303, at 1029–60. R
307. Id. at 1005.
308. See id. at 1007.
309. See id. Chander considers economist proponents of free movement of capital and labor cos-
mopolitan as well. See id. at 1045.
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alties and sovereigns.”310 Because of the economic, legal, and political
relationships diasporas maintain across national borders, diasporas problematize
“the Westphalian cartography of territorially defined sovereigns and the cosmo-
politan utopia of a united mankind.”311 Thus, Chander uses diaspora to recon-
ceive the relationship between the citizen and the nation-state.312
A diasporic approach to liberal theory reveals the possibility of a polity
unbound by territoriality. Diasporic communities often engage in the political
process in their home countries. Members of the Caribbean diaspora, for exam-
ple, regularly return home to vote.313 Transnational communities may also wish
to leverage their presence in host countries to advocate for political issues rele-
vant to their home nation-states.314 Thus, in contrast to the liberal notion that a
territorially bound polity is necessary to preserve national character, diaspora
expresses the possibility of political community across national borders.315 Dias-
pora forces us to rethink “legitimate political participation in essentially territo-
rial terms.”316
Emigration states may also actively promote diasporic engagement in po-
litical life. Homeland governments increasingly nurture relationships with the
diaspora in order to support economic development.317 In some cases, host
states afford diaspora members political and voting rights in host states, even
310. Id. at 1008.
311. Id. at 1048.
312. See id. at 1008.
313. See Org. of Am. States [OAS], Final Report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission to
the General Elections in the Commonwealth of Dominica 15-16, CP/Doc.4474/10 (Mar. 8,
2010); see generally Addis, supra note 305, at 1022–27 (discussing political representation of R
various diasporas).
314. See Chander, supra note 303, at 1029. Diasporic political engagement in Organization for R
Economic Co-operation and Development countries could provide a way to circumvent the
lack of transboundary accountability for certain issues like climate change. For example,
SIDS have unsuccessfully tried to seek climate redress in international courts, yet are affected
by outcomes of U.S. presidential elections (for example, President Trump’s selection and
subsequent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement). Islanders abroad could shape politics in
host states to create accountability across borders on issues that affect them.
315. See id. at 1006 (“Because they maintain important relationships that defy national borders,
diasporas today do not fit easily into the simple Cartesian geography of the nation-state
system, which conceives of political communities expressed only within a nation-state, not
across nation-states.”(emphasis in original)). For further discussion of the liberal conception
of the relationship between territory and political and cultural belonging, see supra Part II.B.
316. Addis, supra note 305, at 988. R
317. See Anupam Chander, Homeward Bound, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 72–76 (2006) (discussing
how national policies aimed at tapping the economic resources the diaspora can provide
toward economic development in emigrant states). More than 50% of U.N. Member States
have institutions that target their diaspora. Alan Gamlen, Diaspora Institutions and Diaspora
Governance, 48 INT’L MIGR. REV. S180 (2014).
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when they cannot access full citizenship. For example, the Netherlands and
Sweden grant resident aliens the right to participate in local elections.318
The political activity of the diaspora across international borders points to
an “emerging transnational space.”319 As Kastoryano writes, “where the country
of origin becomes a source of identity, the country of residence a source of
rights,” “the emerging transnational space” between them becomes “a space of
political action combining the two or more countries.320 I propose that this
emergent transnational space holds not only political potential, but also juris-
generative possibilities.
The jurisgenerative potential of the Global South diaspora finds precedent
in other norm-generating groups. Communities within the confines of the na-
tion-state already engage in private legal orderings to enforce norms outside
those preferred by the “dominant polity.”321 For example, diamond merchants
have created a complex dispute resolution system outside of state-sponsored
law;322 immigrant communities establish community-based savings and credit
associations;323 and Romani people maintain autonomous laws and legal
processes among transnational communities.324 Alternative lawmaking also ex-
ists among religious organizations,325 private actors,326 and through social cus-
toms.327 Diasporic communities, however, can integrate their norm preferences
into the polity of host states, in order to express their allegiances to multiple
states.
318. Hollifield, supra note 146, at 619; see also Aaron Bady, Jedediah Purdy Has an Idea that Could R
Save Us from Capitalism and the Climate Crisis, NATION (Oct. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/
23GQ-UPJM.
319. Riva Kastoryano, Settlement, Transnational Communities and Citizenship, 52 INT’L SOC. SCI.
J. 307, 311 (2000).
320. Id. at 311. See generally Osman Antwi-Boateng, After War Then Peace: The US-Based Libe-
rian Diaspora as Peace-Building Norm Entrepreneurs, 25 J. REFUGEE STUD. 93 (2012) (offer-
ing an example of diaspora-led political action combining U.S. and Liberian perspectives).
321. Chander, supra note 303, at 1010. R
322. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamonds Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 138–41 (1992).
323. See Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 874–78
(1999).
324. See generally Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The
Case of the “Gypsies,” 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993).
325. See generally CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980); Carol Weisbrod,
Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM.
L. 741 (1988) (taking a pluralist approach to church-state relations in the United States).
326. See Bernstein, supra note 322 (using the New York Diamond Dealers Club as an instance of R
“private law-making”); see generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724
(2001).
327. See LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 43–49 (1968).
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What differentiates diaspora from other norm-generating communities is
its “privileging of hybrid possibilities.”328 The diaspora can offer norms not as
an alternative to a hegemonic domestic legal order in the pluralist sense,329 but
rather as integrated within a single domestic legal order, while being constitu-
tive of multiple jurisdictions. In other words, the Global South diaspora has the
opportunity to embed legal norms within the Global North that address Global
South needs. Thus, naming the Global South as a diaspora reveals the power of
their hybridity. As Katyal elegantly puts it, “[T]he notion of a diaspora, by
denaturalizing the centrality of the nation-state, offers a powerful undercurrent
of reconciliation between the destination country and the homeland, because
the very character of a diaspora is characterized by dispersion and variation
across transnational loyalties and differences.”330 In the migration context,
where divergent interests between rich and poor countries abound, this hybrid-
ity remains particularly useful.
This Article opens with the stated objective of destabilizing the conflict
between the Global North and the Global South as the primary site of migra-
tion scholarship. Here, that objective resurfaces. The Global South diaspora,
understood as a community of overlapping allegiances, helps us to reimagine
“the lines that we draw between North and South . . . and the inside and
outside of the law.”331 Global Southerners that reside in the Global North have
the potential to shape international law in reconciliatory ways that would be
impossible if they were wholly bound by territory.332
Leveraging their hybrid positionality would make the Global South dias-
pora valuable non-state actor contributors to international norm creation. As
climate change impacts worsen, likely rendering swaths of the globe unfit for
human habitation,333 the imperative of responding to global injustice will inten-
sify. Thus, understanding the Global South as a political community protesting
“the theft of the commons”334 allows us to imagine the ways that climate change
will further strengthen the Global South diaspora as a collective, and therefore
enhance their capacity to influence international law.
328. Sonia K. Katyal, The Dissident Citizen, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1422 (2010).
329. See generally, e.g., AVIGAIL I. EISENBERG, RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL PLURALISM
(1995) (for an account of pluralist scholarship).
330. Katyal, supra note 328, at 1429. R
331. Id. at 1422.
332. Chander also frames members of the diaspora as creators of transnational law. Chander,
supra note 303, at 1005. Shah argues that the positivist view that only states can create law R
overlooks the ways in which unofficial non-state actors such as diasporic communities shape
international law. Prakash Shah, Diasporas as Legal Actors: Implications for Established Legal
Boundaries, 5 NON-STATE ACTORS & INT’L L. 153, 153 (2005).
333. See Abrahm Lustgarten, The Great Climate Migration, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2020), https://
perma.cc/Y4S7-3BEU.
334. PRASHAD, supra note 298, at 9. R
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CONCLUSION
This Article uses the problem of climate-induced migration, where climate
migrants remain without legal protection largely due to international law’s con-
stitution of sovereignty through exclusion, to ask who has the power to change
international law. I argue that the answer to this question can include non-state
actors. Due to international law’s constraint on the use of force, non-state ac-
tors can participate in legal norm creation in the international realm more ex-
tensively than in the domestic realm because of the theoretical absence of the
threat of violence. The jurisgenerative capacity of non-state actors is important
as an additional source of international legal norm creation given that interna-
tional law has not developed to fully address various transnational problems,
including climate change. Thus, the answer to the question—who has the
power to change international law—extends beyond the challenge of climate-
induced migration. The answer could be applied to any transnational challenge
that outpaces the legal structures available to resolve it.
This Article also locates and names the Global South diaspora as a power-
ful non-state actor. Theoretical discourse framing the discussion on the inter-
national law of migration typically casts a scene of a sovereign Global North
nation-state pitted against a helpless migrant from the Global South. Scholars
reproduce this narrative ad infinitum. However, conceptualizing the interna-
tional law of migration as only mediating conflict between the Global North
and Global Southerners misses critical migration frameworks arising within the
Global South, like FMAs; and also creates an a priori rendering of migrants as
powerless. This Article de-territorializes the notion of the Global South and
asserts the agency of Global Southerners in order to claim the Global South
diaspora as an international legal norm creator. As the harmful effects of global
capitalism extend beyond territorial limits, the capacity of Global Southerners
in the Global North to assert hybrid positionalities can help articulate legal
norms that account not just for the enfranchised, but also for the global
dispossessed.
